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In dynamic environments, split-second sensorimotor decisions must be prioritized according to 
potential payoffs to maximize overall rewards. The impact of relative value on deliberative perceptual 
judgments has been examined extensively, but relatively little is known about value-biasing mechanisms 
in the common situation where physical evidence is strong but the time to act is severely limited. This 
research examines the behavioral and electrophysiological indices of how value biases split-second 
perceptual decisions and the possible mechanisms underlying the process. In prominent decision models, a 
noisy but statistically stationary representation of sensory evidence is integrated over time to an action-
triggering bound, and value-biases are effected by starting the integrator closer to the more valuable bound. 
Here we show significant departures from this account for humans making rapid sensory-instructed action 
choices.  
We show that on a time-constrained color discrimination task, behavior is best explained by a 
simple model in which accumulator “drift rate” (effectively, the mean of the evidence being accumulated) 
is itself biased by value and is non-stationary, increasing over the short decision time frame. Because the 
value bias initially dominates, the model uniquely predicts a dynamic ‘‘turn-around’’ effect on low-value 
cues, where the accumulator first launches toward the incorrect action but is then re-routed to the correct 
one. This was clearly exhibited in electrophysiological signals reflecting motor preparation and evidence 
accumulation. Furthermore, we constructed an extended model that implements this dynamic effect through 
plausible sensory neural response modulations and demonstrates the correspondence between decision 
signal dynamics simulated from a behavioral fit of that model and the empirical decision signals.   
To follow up on the finding that drift rate biases dominate over starting point biases, we examined 
the generality of this effect across different forms of value association. We found that drift rate biases 
dominate not only when value has a long-term association with the sensory alternatives as in the first 
experiment, but also when value has a long-term association with motor alternative. To follow up on the 
proposed sensory neural response modulation model, we further examined whether the model can capture 
dynamic manipulations of the sensory stimulus onset, and confirmed that it can. This model shows that 
value and sensory information can exert simultaneous and dynamically countervailing influences on the 
trajectory of the accumulation-to-bound process, driving rapid, sensory-guided actions.  
We thus conclude that 1) value-based prioritisation is clearly not only exerted through shifting 
starting points, but also through strong modulations of the rate of evidence accumulation ("drift rate"), 2) 
in order to accurately quantify these biases in very fast decisions, it is necessary for models to allow for 
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Perceptual decision making is a widely investigated, core cognitive function that involves 
deliberating over sensory evidence and producing an appropriate motor response (Bogacz et al., 2006). 
Great progress has been made to understand how the brain makes these decisions, using a model framework 
based on a process of accumulating sensory evidence until a threshold is reached, resulting in a choice 
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007). A famous example is the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 2016). Value-based, or 
economic, decisions are also extensively studied, and have been suggested to involve shared mechanisms 
(Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). In daily life people come across situations where 
both types of decisions are implicated at once: the sensory evidence is ambiguous and/or the time to act is 
limited, while the reward associated with the choices are different. These are called value-biased perceptual 
or sensorimotor decisions. While value’s effect on perceptual decision making is mostly investigated when 
the sensory evidence is ambiguous to the subject (Rorie et al., 2010) and either the reward outcome or 
occurrence probability of options are unbalanced (Mulder et al., 2012), there is a paucity of research in 
value-biased perceptual decisions under time pressure to respond (Stanford et al., 2010). The work 
described in this thesis aims to fill this gap.  
It has been widely shown that people aim to optimize the reward outcome by biasing their behavior 
for the high-value option; specifically, they make more choices and faster reaction times for the high-value 
option (Cicmil et al., 2015). Two alternative mechanisms are suggested to account for this biased behavior: 
starting the evidence accumulation process closer to the high-value option threshold (i.e starting point bias) 
and modulating the evidence representation or its weighting depending on the value (i.e drift rate bias) 
(Mulder et al., 2012). These are fundamentally different strategies: while starting point biases only involve 
changing boundary conditions of the dynamic process, drift rate biases directly impact on the dynamic 
evolution of the process itself. While there are a minority of studies showing that drift rate may also be 
biased (Dunovan et al., 2014; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012, Hanks et al., 2011) and, separately, there are 
findings of value-based sensory modulations that could provide a plausible biological basis for drift rate 
bias (Serences, 2008; Kok et al. 2013; Serences & Saproo, 2010), the vast majority of studies historically 
have reported behavioral modelling results in line with a starting point bias (Summerfield and Koechlin, 
2010; Edwards, 1965; Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Dunovan et al., 2014; Voss et al., 2004). However, the 
mechanisms underlying fast value biased perceptual decisions in situations where the major challenge lies 
in meeting strict time constraints, remains unclear. There are two major reasons why the models and 
conclusions from research on slow, perceptually difficult decisions could be expected not to generalise to 
fast, time-constrained situations: 1) to avoid missing deadlines on potentially high-value trials, it may be 
necessary to invoke strong drift rate biases in addition to starting-point biases, and 2) whereas the vast 
majority of decision models assume that the evidence being accumulated is stationary over time, this 
assumption likely breaks down in this situation because decision makers do not have the luxury of waiting 
until a stable evidence representation is encoded before accumulating it. The aim of this thesis is to develop 
new accumulation-to-bound models that allow for nonstationary drift rate dynamics and use them to test 






constrained situations. This research investigated these issues by employing a rapid value biased color 
discrimination task where one of the color options earns more reward than the other when cued; and by 
combining human electrophysiological signatures of decision formation with behavioral modeling. 
 The thesis is broken down as follows. In Chapter 1, the decision making literature is reviewed to 
give a general introduction. Chapter 2 describes an experiment that investigates whether the requirement to 
meet a strict deadline compels subjects to bias their drift rate as well as shift their starting point), and if the 
strict deadline facilitates relaying of sensory information to downstream areas where accumulation happens 
before a stable sensory representation is formed. There were two major outcomes of the first study: 1) that 
drift rate biases seem to dominate over starting point biases in fast decisions, and 2) that the dynamics of 
value- and sensory-driven behaviour can be very well captured by a model with nonstationary sensory 
response dynamics that can be biased. In Chapter 3, we follow-up on outcome 1, specifically asking whether 
this drift rate bias dominance is peculiar to the case where value has a long-term association with the sensory 
alternatives, or whether it occurs also when value has a long-term association with MOTOR alternative. 
Lastly in Chapter 4, we follow up on outcome 2, asking whether our value-modulated sensory response 




































Chapter 1 BACKGROUND  
 
Value-biased perceptual decision making in literature 
 
The neurobiology of cognitive processes has long been intriguing researchers. One key process is 
a basic perceptual decision where a motor act is committed by evaluating a sensory stimulus. The neural 
mechanisms underlying perceptual decision making have been investigated with a variety of methods 
(EEG, fMRI, single neuron recording) and subject species (human, non-human primate, rats), using various 
tasks. An important tool in the investigation of decision making is computational modeling. Theoretical 
and computational models are created to test a convergent understanding of the findings from different 
methodologies. Model simulations in combination with behavioral (e.g., Ditterich, 2010; Tsetsos et al., 
2011) and neural recordings (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2007) are used to compare and test the hypotheses of 
models, and in turn, model predictions are used to design new tasks to investigate the validity of models.  
 
In the literature, decision making is categorized into perceptual and value-based (or economic) decisions 
but since most of the decisions in daily life include valuation of options to decide, value is an inherent part 
of nearly all ecologically valid perceptual and other higher order decisions (Summerfield and Tsetsos, 
2012). Thus investigating how value is integrated with sensory information to guide actions, or in other 
words value-biased perceptual decisions, has become one of the frontiers of decision making research 
(Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). In this literature review, I first briefly introduce the models and 
neurophysiological signals associated with the study of perceptual decision making relevant to the thesis; I 
then give a brief overview of the area of value-based decision making, and finally, discuss in more detail 
studies that have focussed on the particular topic of value-biased perceptual decision making. 
 
Value is inherent in perceptual decision making so controlling for it and manipulating it directly is critical 
to our understanding of cognition more broadly. The key questions in this area are how and where are 
perceptual decisions formed, how and where is value encoded, what are the mechanisms by which value is 
integrated into the decision making process and how can they be captured by mathematical models. A major 
goal of this area of research is to develop models that can perfectly capture both the behavioral and neural 
signatures of value-biased decision making across a range of tasks. The knowledge gathered through this 
line of investigation is also important as it can be exploited to gain insight and find ameliorative ways about 
neuropathologies (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004) since psychiatric diseases such as obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, anorexia, psychopathy, and addiction are implicated with defective decision making (D Lee, 
2013). 
 
1.1  Perceptual (PDM) versus Economic Decision Making (EDM) 
PDM focuses on how subjects choose the action based on the detection, discrimination or 
categorization of sensory information, while EDM is concerned with how subjects choose the action 
depending on their valuation, usually learned through the reinforcement history of options. One of the most 
important differences between PDM and EDM research is where they introduce the uncertainty into the 






consists of randomly moving dots while a certain proportion of them are moving coherently in one direction. 
Subjects are instructed to report the direction of coherently moving dots and are rewarded according to their 
accuracy. This noisy stimulus creates perceptual uncertainty while the values associated with choice 
outcome are certain. In EDM, the subjective value or desirability of an option is uncertain while the stimuli 
associated with choice are certain (Daw et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Also EDM and PDM have 
different takes on the optimality of a decision. While PDM often shows that subjects are optimal as a 
statistically ideal observer (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ashby and Gott, 1988) where they maximize reward 
rate or accuracy, EDM shows economic decision making is generally irrational and sub-optimal (Tversky 
and Kahneman,1981). This stems from the different approaches of the fields and in EDM, assessing 
optimality is more complex because the diverse range of human behavior and complicated context that 
humans evolved in is difficult to take into account, as it is in play in real world cases. 
 
Also the two research lines emphasize different brain areas and neural circuits according to their focuses. 
PDM researchers emphasize that the identity of a stimulus is determined in cortical circuits. Sensorimotor 
tasks are done by receiving inputs from sensory cortices and processed in dorsal stream cortical regions to 
reach a response. A groundbreaking finding was that when RDK stimulus is utilized and saccadic response 
is required, lateral intraparietal area is shown to code for stimulus features in reference to targets’ locations 
by utilizing the input from motion sensitive area, MT (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Bennur and Gold, 2011). 
Other cortical areas such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are also found to show similar decision related 
activity which cannot be explained by sensory or motor coding alone (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; de Lafuente 
and Romo, 2006). Meanwhile, EDM research has mainly implicated subcortical, limbic and interconnected 
structures in determining the value of the stimulus. The dopamine system has been  shown to play an 
important role in the coding of the value of food/money (Schultz, 1986) and modulating the response of 
orbitofrontal cortex accordingly (Critchley and Rolls,1996; O’Doherty et al., 2001). Also, activity in the 
striatum and anterior cingulate cortex has been shown to reflect the difference between estimated and actual 
rewards, called reward prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997) which is suggested to drive reinforcement 
learning (Glimcher, 2011). 
 
1.2  Perceptual Decision Making: 
It is suggested by several studies that decision making process is based on the integration of 
evidence toward a decision criterion (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Smith and 
Ratcliff, 2004; Carpenter 2009, Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). Electrophysiological 
studies in non-human primates provide supporting evidence for this mechanism in parietal cortex, ie lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP) (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Bollimunta and Ditterich, 2012), frontal cortex, e.g. 
frontal eye fields (FEF) (Kim and Shadlen, 1999), basal ganglia (Ding and Gold, 2013), and superior 
colliculus (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999; Ratcliff and Hasegawa, 2007). Human studies support the idea 
with evidence coming from different methods, such as magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Donner and 







Figure 1.1: Random Dot Kinematogram Task. In this prototypical perceptual decision making task, monkeys are 
trained to make a saccade to one of two possible peripheral targets based on the dominant direction of motion within 
a stochastic dot kinetogram. Subjects are rewarded with liquid if they are correct. Recorded neurons’ response field 
is highlighted as RF which corresponds to the right target (T1) (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) 
 
Much of the progress in the neurophysiology of PDM has been made using one specific task involving two-
alternative forced choice discrimination of the dominant motion direction of a Random Dot Kinematogram 
(RDK) (Figure 1.1).  Specific features of this task make it well-suited to studying neural mechanisms of 
deliberative decision making under conditions of perceptual ambiguity. The coherence level of dots 
(proportion of dots moving in target direction) can be changed to manipulate the evidence strength and 
therefore the difficulty of the task. Many coherence levels are often randomly interleaved in a task, and 
constrains the models with accuracy dimension to comply with. Also due to the stochastic nature of dot 
motion, subjects strongly benefit from temporal integration which extends the evidence integration duration 
and facilitates close examination of the process.  
 
1.2.1  Modeling 
 
Decades of research has attempted to develop models that explain choices and choice latencies on decision 
tasks. While some models (like DDM – Drift Diffusion Model) have closed form solutions, others require 
numerical solutions through computer simulation. Accuracy and reaction time distributions are key 
behavioral measures to account for by models. A better fit supports the model’s validity and gives more 
explanatory power to its theoretical assumptions. The most prominent class of computational model for 
studying PDM has been that of sequential sampling models (SSM) (Townsend and Ashby, 1983; Vickers, 
1970). The basic idea is integrating momentary noisy sensory evidence samples in favor of the options until 
a level of certainty (a threshold) is reached and the corresponding option is selected. This approach has 
plausibility for modeling PDM since the noise in the signal can be averaged out by integrating multiple 
samples of evidence and neural signals are assumed to be noisy (Parker and Newsome, 1998). Also if the 
decision process is reduced to distinguishing between two alternative options, sequential probability ratio 
test is the most optimal version of SSM in the sense that it requires least number of steps to reach a decision 
for a fixed error rate (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948), where the log likelihood ratio for each alternative is 
accumulated and the option reaching the set threshold prevails (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Neural recordings 
have suggested that neurons can carry out this computation (Yang and Shadlen, 2007). This model is in line 






There now exist several model variants based on this core scheme but diverging in structure in 
several key ways. For example, an important divergence in prominent models is whether the accumulated 
evidence is absolute for each alternative or relative to each other. While race models are based on the former 
with a neurobiological plausibility and providing explanatory power for multiple alternative choices 
(Brown and Heathcote, 2008), diffusion models are based on the latter, and have been claimed to provide 
better fits to behavioral and neural data (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).  
 
Figure 1.2: Diffusion model illustration. Two sample paths of momentary evidence representation are shown (red and 
blue). The process starts at z and accumulates evidence until it reaches either upper bound (generally represents correct 
choice) or lower bound (generally represents error choice). Mean rate of accumulation varies from trial to trial because 
of variability in the quality of the stimulus information and it allows the model to predict errors that are slower than 
correct responses. Another behaviorally important source of variability is the location of the starting point of the 
accumulation process  and  it allows the model to predict errors that are faster than correct responses. Another source 
of variability is the duration of the non-decision component of times for stimulus encoding and response execution 
(RT) which allows the model to describe the shape of the leading edge of RT distributions (Smith and Ratcliff 2004). 
 
In Drift Diffusion Model (Ratcliff, 1978) (Figure 1.2), the difference between the evidence corresponding 
to two alternative options is accumulated. Mathematically denoted: 
 
where A represents the average differential evidence per time, termed drift rate, in favor of the correct 
option; cdW term represents white noise, Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and c^2dt variance, which 
causes diffusion (Bogacz et al., 2006). So dx is the change in x (Decision Variable, DV) per time increment, 
consisting of the drift due to evidence and the diffusion due to noise. As drift rate A increases, evidence per 
time increases relative to the noise, which increases accuracy and decreases the time to reach the particular 
threshold and hence the reaction time (Appx 1). In addition to the noise in the diffusion process itself, other 
sources of variability are often introduced to the model to account for certain aspects of behavioral data, 
such as the relative average speed of correct versus incorrect responses. Drift rate variability and starting 
point variability across trials result in different predictions (Figure 1.3). For example, when the stimulus is 
highly ambiguous or not attended, more errors with longer reaction times than correct responses are 
committed which can be accounted for by drift rate variability (Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff and 
Rouder, 2000). Meanwhile, starting point variability means that from trial to trial the process can randomly 
start closer to the correct or incorrect bound, and when the latter happens fast errors result, tending to 
produce shorter average reaction times for errors (Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998)(Appx 2) (Ratcliff and 







Figure 1.3: a) Effect of different drift rates. b) Effect of different starting points (Johnson and Ratcliff, 2014). When 
there is more drift rate variability in the model, more errors will tend to be slower than correct responses. When there 
is more starting point variability, more errors will tend to be faster than correct responses. 
 
In the models in this thesis, we assume a one-dimensional process that integrates differential evidence to 
an upper or lower bound similar to the DDM. As discussed later, even though the neural implementation 
involves two racing processes, neural findings support DDM’s theoretical assumption of relative evidence 
accumulation. It has been shown that the firing rate of the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) neurons with RFs 
coinciding with the losing option decreases proportional to the evidence strength (i.e motion coherence) 
while the activity of neurons with RFs coinciding with the winning option increases (Roitman and Shadlen, 
2002).  
      
1.2.1.1. alternative model structures 
As mentioned above, there are several sequential sampling model variants.Relative to the DDM, some other 
prominent models have additional features such as leakage and different forms of inhibition between the 
alternatives. Although we do not explore these features in the work in this thesis, we will briefly outline the 
differences among these model structures here for completeness. In Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Model 
(Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993), in addition to DDM parameters, the rate of change of decision variable 
depends on its current value as well. Lambda represents this change.  
 
DV (x) can accelerate or decelerate toward the thresholds according to the sign of lambda. A negative 
lambda implies deceleration around the correct option threshold (since x=-A/λ is the attractor point and is 
positive when λ<0) resulting in slowing down before crossing it, suggested to correspond to conservative 
behavior (Figure 1.4). A positive lambda implies an acceleration towards any of the thresholds depending 
on its current side (i.e evidence will accumulate faster in favor of hypotheses which are already partially 
confirmed) resulting in faster responses but more errors, suggested to correspond to risky behavior. Also 
authors propose that increasing the rewards for correct responses would correspond to an increase in lambda 







Figure 1.4: Illustration of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) diffusion model (Ratcliff and Smith, 2004) 
 
While the assumption is that the net difference between the evidences for alternative options is accumulated 
in DDM and O-U models, in race models separate integrators accumulate evidence in favor of each 
alternative. In inhibition-free race model (Vickers, 1970),  
 
I1 and I2 denote mean evidence (drift rates) for alternative options. y1 and y2 are the integrators of the 
competing sensory evidence signals, which are composed of mean drift rate (I1 or I2) plus the noise (W1 
or W2). The alternative which exceeds the predefined threshold first, results in the corresponding response. 







Figure 1.5: a) Race model b) Mutual inhibition model c) Feedforward inhibition model d) Pooled inhibition model. 
Open circles in disks denote excitatory neural populations, filled circles in disk denote inhibitory neural populations. 
In all panels arrows stand for excitatory connections; lines with filled-circles stand for inhibitory connections (Bogacz 
et al., 2006). 
 
In the mutual inhibition model (Usher and McClelland, 2001), evidence (e.g from MT neurons) in favor of 
the alternatives are accumulated by separate integrators (e.g LIP neurons) as was the case in inhibition-free 
race model. In addition, the integrators are leaky so their activity decay with time and also they have 
inhibitory effect on each other. (Figure 1.5b) These dynamics are expressed by the equations:  
 
Where k is decay rate and w is the weight of inhibitory connection between the integrators and both of these 
parameters are assumed to be non-negative. Also to account for the fact that the neural firing rates are never 
negative, y is assigned 0 if its value becomes negative. 
 
In the feedforward inhibition model (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Ditterich et al., 2003), the integrators 
are not leaky and accumulation rates are independent of the current value of decision variables but an 








where u is the weight of feedforward inhibitory connections and it is non-negative. This model implies that 
noise from both evidence representing neuronal populations influence both integrators (Figure 1.5c). 
 
The Pooled inhibition model (Bogacz et al., 2006) is based on Wang (2002)’s biophysically informed 
model. Although Wang (2002) based their model on the properties of individual spiking neurons of LIP 
rather than averaged representations of neural populations, Bogacz et al (2006) approximated the activity 
of a population of neurons by a noisy connectionist unit. It is similar to the mutual inhibition model, but the 
integrator neurons have self-excitatory recurrent projections (vyi term), dependent on their current 
activation, in order to sustain stimulus representations (as in short-term memory) until a decision is reached 
and the two competing integrators excite a common pool of neurons according to their current activity 
which in turn inhibits both equally (-wy3 term) (Figure 1.5d).  
 
In such biologically based computational models, it is suggested that the amplification of the difference 
between alternative options during the decision formation process originates from the recurrent excitation 
(synaptic reverberation) mediated by NMDA receptors at the excitatory recurrent synapses and feedback 
inhibition (Wang, 2002; Lau and Bi, 2005) which has a similar neurobiological basis with working memory 
concept as it stands for actively holding information online.  
  
1.2.1.2. Is the evidence stationary in time? 
In modeling work an important issue is the temporal representation of stimulus information. The vast 
majority of models assume that the sensory evidence representation is stationary throughout the 
accumulation process, corresponding to a constant drift rate. This simplification ignores the fact that 
evidence representations take some time to develop; for example, the motion direction evidence in MT 
neurons assumed to be integrated in dot motion decisions (Huk and Shadlen, 2005) forms gradually over a 
short period of time (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). For long-duration decisions about ambiguous stimuli, this 
can be ignored because one can assume that accumulation begins after such initial nonstationary dynamics. 
In fact, Ratcliff and colleagues (e.g. Ratcliff et al 2016) suggest that an early, lower-level integration process 
may unfold which determines the drift rate itself. That is, stimulus information is integrated until a short-
term representation is formed and this representation is utilized during the main, deliberative evidence 
accumulation process as a constant drift. The drift rate stationarity assumption requires particular critical 
consideration in tasks with very short deadlines, because it is unlikely optimal to delay accumulation until 
a stable, stationary evidence representation is achieved, and we address this in the studies described below.   
 An interesting area of cognition where dynamically changing drift rate has been instrumental is in 
fast discrimination of conflicting sensory inputs, as seen in sensory interference tasks such as the Eriksen 
flanker task (Servant et al., 2015; Servant et al., 2016; White et al., 2018) . In the Eriksen Flanker task, a 
target item must be quickly discriminated, but is flanked on both sides by a number of distracter items that 
can be the same or different (incongruent). In the “shrinking spotlight model” of this task, drift rate is 
determined by the relative activation of the target item compared to the flankers, and so on incongruent 
trials the drift rate shifts from negative to positive as attention is narrowed from the overall conflicting 






based on value associations that sometimes conflict with the sensory evidence, can be captured by models 
that involve dynamic changes in drift rate of a broadly similar nature, although generated in a different way. 
 
1.2.2  Neural Circuits 
 
Parietal cortex has been a key area in decision making research as where the decision deliberation takes 
place in the light of sensory information. Several findings support this role of parietal cortex. It has been 
shown that LIP neurons with RFs corresponding to the choice targets have an increasing (if evidence or 
current DV is in favor of this option) or decreasing (if evidence or current DV is not in favor of this option) 
firing rate whose rate of increase is proportional to evidence strength (e.g motion coherence). This 
information encoding depending on the sensory input and spatial coding in the frame of motor response 
suggests integration of sensory and motor data, which means LIP neurons are not reflecting only sensory 
or only response signals (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). Also the increasing neural activity during constant 
strength evidence presentation reflects an accumulation of information (Figure 1.7). This increasing 
activity stops at a particular firing rate before initiation of an overt response, even if the evidence strength 
is manipulated (Kiani et al., 2008; Mazurek et al., 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Roitman and Shadlen, 
2002) (evidence strength manipulation rather affects the rate of accumulation). This stereotyped critical 
activity level  which does not depend on sensory input supports the threshold concept used in models. In 
the light of these properties of LIP neurons, accumulation-to-bound is suggested to be the mechanism for 
perceptual decision making in LIP neurons. Also besides encoding evidence accumulation,  LIP neurons 
have been long implicated in attention, encoding a relative saliency map of  external space (Gottlieb, 2007), 
shape selectivity (Sereno and Maunsell, 1998), category specificity (Bennur and Gold, 2011), color (Bennur 
and Gold, 2011), direction selectivity (Fanini and Assad, 2009), passive visual responses (Hamed and 
Duhamel, 2002), combining different features of a stimulus (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) and even in 
decision studies, they have been found to encode many other things about the task other than cumulative 
evidence (Meister et al., 2013; Park et al., 2014).   
 
LIP is in fact one of many areas where decision formation dynamics have been observed. Several areas and 
circuits have been found to exhibit activity consistent with different elements of the decision process such 
as coding incoming sensory evidence, accumulating net evidence, implementing a threshold for decision 
criterion. We will mention the key areas and circuits implicated in these functions respectively (Figure 1.6). 
            a)                                                             b)  
      
Figure 1.6: a) Visual decision-making (green) and valuation (blue) related areas and circuits. (McCoy and Platt, 2004) 






V1, primary visual cortex; LIP, lateral intraparietal area; FEF, frontal eye fields; SC, superior colliculus; BS, brainstem 
eye movement control circuits. (Glimcher, 2009) 
 
Neurons in the middle temporal area (MT) are shown to encode motion properties of stimuli, such that 
direction-sensitive neurons encode information about the direction of motion (Dubner and Zeki, 1971; Zeki, 
1974; Britten et al., 1993) as they respond if the stimulus is moving in their preferred direction (Born and 
Bradley, 2005).  It is shown that these neurons’ activity increases with stimulus coherence when the dot 
movement is in these neurons’ preferred direction and decreases if it is in the opposite direction (Celebrini 
and Newsome, 1994) (Figure 1.7a).  
 
 
Figure 1.7: Responses of MT and LIP neurons during reaction time (RT)-RDK task where direction is reported by 
saccade. a) Left: The responses are aligned to onset of random-dot motion. Shaded insert shows average responses 
from direction selective neurons in area MT to motion in the preferred and anti-preferred directions. Right: The 
responses are aligned to the eye movement. The LIP firing rates approximate the integral of a difference in firing rate 
between MT neurons with opposite direction preferences. b) Responses grouped by RT. All trials reach a stereotyped 
firing rate ∼70 ms before saccade initiation (arrow). (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Gold and Shadlen, 2007) 
          
While these features suggested sensory evidence coding of MT neurons, other findings provided more solid 
evidence. Salzman et al. (1990,1992) showed that microstimulation of MT neurons coding for a particular 
direction, increased the choices made in favor of that direction. Ditterich et al. (2003) showed that 
microstimulation of MT accelerates decisions in the preferred direction of the neurons that are stimulated, 
but decelerates the choices in the opposite direction.  
 
Similar to the experimentation done for MT, studies showed that microstimulation of LIP neurons with RFs 
at a particular visual field, biased the proportion of saccades made towards this area (Hanks et al., 2006), 
supporting the hypothesis that LIP neurons encode an accumulator variable which determines the outcome 
of perceptual choices (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Mazurek et al., 2003; Huk and Shadlen, 2005). This 
evidence integration of LIP in the frame of saccadic action is supported by several studies (Churchland et 
al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). Also LIP activity reflects modulation 
by expected reward magnitude and probability (Platt and Glimcher, 1999) which is detailed in the value-






      
Superior colliculus (SC), an area that receives visual inputs from LIP and sends motor projections to the 
brainstem and the spinal cord, has similar properties with LIP such as “building up” activity (Ratcliff and 
Cherian, 2003), and shown to be involved in controlling orienting behaviors such as eye movements 
(Horwitz and Newsome, 1999; 2001a; 2001b). In SC, there are “burst neurons” that fire just before a 
saccade is initiated. This particular activity is suggested to signal a motor plan execution and argued to 
reflect the decision threshold that is implemented in models (Lo and Wang, 2006). SC is argued to set this 
decision threshold with dopamine-dependent plasticity of cortico-striatal synapses (Lo and Wang, 2006). 
(Figure 31.10) Some human work has found evidence for other subcortical areas being involved in setting 
decision criteria. For example, Frank et al. (2015) recorded fMRI and EEG activity while participants 
completed a reinforcement-learning task, and then regressed single-trial neural activity onto parameters of 
the diffusion model. Their results support that decision threshold in reward-based tasks is adjusted as a 
function of subthalamic nucleus activity and the communication from pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) to STN, since mediofrontal theta band activity in the EEG signal and the BOLD response in the 
fMRI signal of the STN and pre-SMA are shown to modulate the response boundary parameter. 
 
Also prefrontal cortex is implicated in encoding the decision variable. In a neurophysiological recording 
study in prearcuate gyrus of macaque monkeys performing a direction discrimination task, it was shown 
that the recorded neural populations predicted the choice and showed “turn-around” dynamics in their 
activity (sign change), termed Changes of Mind, in some trials  (Kiani et al., 2014). In these trials activity 
was more likely to go from an incorrect to a correct choice, more likely for weak and intermediate stimuli 
than for strong stimuli, and they were more likely earlier in the trial, suggesting that the recorded neural 
populations dynamically encoded the decision variable (DV) in individual trials. 
 
1.2.3. Human decision signals 
While lesion, microstimulation and neural recording studies in monkeys provided evidence for the location 
and properties of decision related neurons, EEG studies provided insight about the timing of processes with 
its high temporal resolution and non-invasive nature enabling human studies. During sensorimotor decision 
making, the decision formation and motor preparation for action happens in parallel in the brain. Centro-
parietal positivity (CPP), an electrophysiological marker of evidence accumulation process that appears 
over parietal scalp regions in human is found to correspond to the decision variable in sequential sampling 
models since its buildup rate scales with evidence strength and its amplitude was found to peak at a 
stereotypical level (Kelly and O'Connell, 2013; O'Connell et al., 2012) (Figure 1.8). While the CPP reflected 
the deliberation process, the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), which is a marker of relative motor 
preparation of left/right limbs recorded over the motor regions, exhibited similar buildup dynamics but with 
an additional time delay relative to the CPP. This supports the idea that sensory evidence flows continuously 








Figure 1.8 : Integration-to-treshold dynamics motion discrimination in human brain. A) Schematic of continuous RDM task. 
Participants monitored a centrally presented dot kinetogram for step transitions from random to coherent motion. B) RT (left) and 
miss rate (right) decreased as a function of coherence across the 13 subjects. Error bars indicate SEM. C) CPP-waveforms aligned 
to stimulus onset (left) and response execution (middle) and signal scalp topography (right, color bar represents signal amplitude). 
D) LRP waveforms aligned to stimulus onset (left) and response execution (middle) measured as the contralateral minus ipsilateral 
potential difference over frontocentral sites, and the scalp topography of the difference between left motion and right motion trials 
at the time of response execution (right). Both signals exhibit a gradual buildup whose rate is proportional to the strength of coherent 
motion and which terminates at a stereotyped potential. Markers running along the bottom of plot C and D indicate the center of 
100 ms time windows in which linear contrast of signal slope as a function of coherence reached significance (one-tailed based on 
prediction of faster signal buildup with increasing coherence, p<0.05), and arrows indicate the point at which each signal reaches 
half of its peak voltage (averaging across coherences), highlighting that the evidence - dependent buildup of the supra modal CPP 
precedes that the effector-selective LRP. (Kelly & O’Connell, 2013). 
 
1.2.4. Neurophysiological evidence for “urgency signals” 
Another concept that is especially implicated in tasks with time pressure is that of “urgency signals”. 
Urgency is defined as a component of decision variable buildup that grows with elapsed time but is 
independent of the evidence. When urgency is cast as an additive component alongside cumulative 
evidence, it is equivalent to “collapsing bounds” (Hanks et al., 2014). In the urgency gating model, time-
dependent urgency is cast as a process that increasingly boosts the multiplicative gain of evidence and noise 
until a decision is reached (Cisek et al., 2009), which is an alternative implementation but a similar principle 
to additive urgency models. The assumption is that the accumulated evidence is amplified more and more 
as the time taken to make a decision grows (Ratcliff et al., 2016). Collapsing bounds assumes that the 
amount of evidence required to trigger a decision (the ‘threshold’) becomes smaller with increasing time 
taken to make the decision. This contrasts with the standard assumption that the threshold is unchanging 
(Ratcliff et al., 2016). Collapsing bounds provide a natural mechanism for ensuring a decision is made in a 
reasonable time in the case of non-evidential stimuli where the constant boundaries would predict at least 
extremely long response times, even though there is no information to be gained from repeated sampling 
from the stimulus (Zhang et al., 2014). As does drift rate variability, urgency signals and collapsing bounds 
also predict slower mean RT for errors (O’Connell et al., 2018). In tasks without strict deadlines, their 
models’ fit to behavioural data have been found to be inferior to fixed threshold models (Hawkins et al., 
2015; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016), but there is growing evidence that they do apply 






In Churchland et al. (2008), the authors fitted a function (hyperbolic, in their case) to the build-up 
activity of LIP neurons (with RFs corresponding to target locations) seen on 0% coherence motion trials in 
RDK task and used this evidence-independent time-dependent increase (urgency function) as constraints in 
the bounded accumulation model fit to the behavioral data. The general idea of the influence of elapsed 
time on the computations that underlie decision processes is also evidenced in another study (Hanks et al., 
2011) that modeled the bias (due to prior probability manipulation in RDK task) on DV as a function 
increasing with time and evidence unreliability. Also Hanks et al. (2014) found that speed-accuracy tradeoff 
(SAT) was implemented in LIP by varying a time-dependent (increasing with time), evidence-independent 
(same for different coherences) signal that was added to responses during the same period that the neurons 
represent the accumulating evidence leading to a choice. It was more pronounced in speed condition in 
order to reduce the amount of evidence needed to terminate a decision.  
 
1.3  Value-Based Decision Making: 
Economic decision making, neuroeconomics and value-based decision making are all interrelated 
areas of research that focus on the valuation of options and making a decision based on this subjective 
valuation process (Figure 1.9). Although we do not examine value-based decisions in this thesis, our 
perceptual decision tasks involve value biases and therefore the broader literature of how value is 
represented and processed in the brain is of interest, and we discuss some key research in this area for 
completeness. Since this section does not newly address concepts that are critical to understand the 
experiments conducted for the thesis, it can safely be skipped and returned to later for interest. 
Identifying the outcome associated with each action and estimating their reward value has been 
emphasized as key processes. Investigating the behavior and neurophysiology regarding value 
representation, modification with new information or time, integration with basic perceptual decision 
mechanisms have been the focus of these fields. A variety of tasks and methods are utilized to answer the 
question how and where the value of an option is represented as a common currency for comparison and 
choice across reward types. One study shows that a subregion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC)/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a candidate area (Levy and Glimcher, 2012). With their meta-
analysis of several studies, they identified this area as its activity is correlated with subjective value in many 
different task types and reward kinds. Also the finding that options with same desirability for the subject, 
generated equivalent BOLD signals in this area of vmPFC/OFC strengthens its suggested role (Levy and 
Glimcher, 2012). Another model-driven fMRI study shows that ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity 
reflects the difference of cost information from amygdala and benefit information from ventral striatum, 
and this difference signal is accumulated in middle intraparietal sulcus (Basten et al., 2010). This finding 
shows that the net evidence accumulation-to-bound mechanism suggested in drift diffusion models of PDM 








Figure 1.9: Subjective valuation task (Krajbich et al., 2010) 
    
Economic decision making studies contributed to decision making literature about value coding 
mechanisms (how is value represented neurally) and locations (where is it represented) (Basten et al., 2010; 
Philiastides et al.,2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Regarding the relaying mechanism (how is value 
representation relayed to brain areas where it will be utilized for different tasks), it has been shown that 
different groups of midbrain dopamine neurons are implicated in relaying positive or negative valence 
motivational signals (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009) as midbrain dopamine neurons calculate the 
difference between estimated and actual rewards and send this reward prediction error signal to the basal 
ganglia, particularly striatum where the value suggested to be coded (Sakagami and Tanaka, 2016). Also 
some areas of the parietal cortex are directly linked with orbito-frontal areas (Cavada et al., 2000), so fast 
large-scale synchronization in the gamma band is proposed to reflect the rapid transfer of information 
between these areas (Gregoriou et al., 2009) suggesting that parietal areas that are responsible for perceptual 
readout of the incoming sensory evidence (Huk and Shadlen, 2005), may be receiving information about 
valuation and comparison of the offered alternatives from frontal regions (Basten et al., 2010; Philiastides 
et al., 2010) (Figure 1.10). Regarding the coding mechanism, an example would be the study by Platt and 
Glimcher (1999),where they found that activity of single neurons in the posterior parietal cortex is 
correlated with the probability and the magnitude of expected rewards, showing how value is coded in 
neural level. Regarding the locations of value representation, it has been shown that reward size and the 
BOLD signal in a fMRI study where the subjects are asked to choose between rewarding stimuli, are 
correlated in the medial prefrontal cortex (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008), the ventral striatum (Delgado et 








Figure 1.10: Illustration of brain areas and interactions between them for value-based decisions (Levy and Glimcher, 
2012) 
 
1.3.1  Neural Circuits 
       
In EDM literature reward is defined as the stimulus’ motivational or economic value, irrespective of other 
sensory properties (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). Approximately 80% of midbrain dopamine neurons show 
phasic activations for 200ms, about 100ms after the subject obtains unpredicted food or liquid rewards 
(Schultz, 2007). When a stimulus is associated with a reward as in pavlovian conditioning, this stimulus 
now predicts the upcoming reward. While midbrain DA neurons do not show activity for receiving a 
predicted reward, it is shown that there are several brain areas which show activity proportional to the 
predicted reward by mere presentation of the associated stimulus. Reward-predictive neuron firing has been 
reported from areas, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000), the prefrontal cortex 
(Watanabe, 1996), the parietal cortex (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004), and the striatum 
(Kawagoe et al., 1998).  And it is shown that the responses of these neurons increase proportionally with 
expected reward magnitude, such as liquid volume (Tobler et al. 2005), supporting the role of reward value 
or utility coding. 
 
While midbrain DA activity does not reflect the reward if the associated stimulus precisely predicts the 
timing and magnitude of upcoming reward, it is shown that their firing is proportional to the discrepancy 
between expected and obtained reward, termed reward-prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997; Satoh et al., 
2003; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). It is postulated that this reward-prediction error signal, coded by 
midbrain DA neurons, influence postsynaptic neurons and drives learning of the new value of the stimulus 
by synaptic modifications (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1981) (Figure 1.10). Phasic DA 
signals are suitable for transmitting time-specific information so they are implicated in associating reward 
with stimuli and actions which can in turn inform value-based decision mechanisms. In the frame of an 
overt decision making this dopamine based learning mechanism is suggested to combine specific movement 









Figure 1.11: The principal dopaminergic pathways of the midbrain. SNpc: substantia nigra pars compacta, VTA: 
ventral tegmental area (Glimcher, 2009). 
 
Basal ganglia is a key structure in value-based decisions. Particularly striatum has connections with sensory 
and motor cortical areas and receives input from DA system for reward coding (Alexander and Crutcher, 
1990). It is shown that dopaminergic projections to the striatum are implicated in reward prediction since 
besides responding to unexpected reward delivery, they respond to reward cues and they decrease firing 
when predicted rewards do not occur (Schultz et al., 1997). 
 
Striatum: Studies on rats showed that ventral parts of the striatum elicit the most vigorous self-stimulation 
compared to other brain areas (Olds and Fobes, 1981), which is confirmed in other species, including rabbits 
(Bruner 1966), cats (Roberts 1958), monkeys (Brady 1961), and humans (Heath and Mickle 1960). Thus, 
striatal circuits is a good candidate for searching where subjective value may be encoded. Also it is shown 
that striatum receives dopaminergic input, the cortico-striatal synapses show dopamine-dependent plasticity 
(Wickens et al., 1996; Reynolds et al., 2001) and striatum can exert control over dopamine firing via its 
descending inhibitory (GABAergic) projections to midbrain dopaminergic nuclei (Haber et al., 2000). 
  
Ventral parts of striatum (i.e., NAcc, ventral caudate, and medial putamen)  are reciprocally connected with 
ventromedial cortical and subcortical areas that are implicated in emotion and motivation, and dorsolateral 
parts of striatum (i.e., dorsolateral caudate and putamen) are connected with dorsolateral cortical and 
subcortical areas implicated in movement and memory (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994). These properties and 
architecture also shows that striatum is in a suitable place to code for valuation and association with related 
action (Mogenson et al., 1980) (Figure 1.12). A study showed that firing of striatal projection neurons 
before a saccade was modulated by the amount of reward the monkey had received for the saccade to a 







Figure 1.12: A schematic model of reinforcement learning in the cortico-basal ganglia circuit. Based on the state 
representation in the cortex, the striatum learns the state value and action values. The state-value coding striatal 
neurons project to dopamine neurons, which send the temporal difference signal back to the striatum. The outputs of 
action-value coding striatal neurons channel through the globus pallidus and the thalamus, where stochastic action 
selection may be realized (Doya, 2007; Doya and Kimura, 2009).   
       
Another study showed that while striatum coded for expected reward probabilities of options regardless of 
choice, neurons coding for the action-value of the action to be chosen was more prevalent in globus pallidus 
(Pasquereau et al., 2007), suggesting that action selection is realized downstream of the basal ganglia (Doya, 
2000; Watanabe et al., 2003) (Figure 1.13). 
 
Several fMRI studies focused on ventral striatum and they showed that ventral striatum activity reflected 
anticipation of reward (Knutson et al., 2001), monetary reward expectation (Breiter et al., 2001), expected 
values of rewards (Knutson et al., 2005) and monetary reward magnitude and decreasing reward value with 
time (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Medial prefrontal cortex activity is also shown to be correlated with 








Figure 1.13: Diagram showing how the basal ganglia encode reward values of external signals and actions, and how 
desirable actions are selected. GP/SN, globus pallidus and substantia nigra; CM/PF, centromedian parafascicular 
nuclei of intralaminar thalamus. (Doya and Kimura, 2009) 
 
OFC : Orbitofrontal cortex lies on the ventral surface of the frontal lobes and it is shown to encode stimulus–
reward associations (Schoenbaum et al., 1998). Besides striatum, fraction of neurons in orbitofrontal cortex 
are also activated in relation to rewards and reward- predicting stimuli (Ravel et al., 2003), and the activity 
is shown to be proportional to reward magnitude (Wallis and Miller, 2003). However, while some striatal 
reward neurons do, most orbitofrontal reward neurons do not discriminate between spatial positions or 
visual features of reward-related stimuli (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Hassani et al., 2001). Also in a 
monkey electrophysiology study of binary choice, authors found that a population of neurons in OFC 
encoded for the subjective value of the two outcomes independently of the action that had to be taken to 
obtain them (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). 
 
Prefrontal and parietal cortex: While some OFC neurons seem to code for value of goods in a more abstract 
way in the sense that they do not encode the value in reference to an action but rather for comparison among 
goods, some neurons in OFC encode both reward and movement parameters. In addition to striatum, 
prefrontal and parietal cortex contain such neurons that unite reward information with specific movements 
(Watanabe, 1996; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004). 
 
Expected value is defined as the probability of obtaining the reward  multiplied by the reward value. A 
fMRI study with a cued reaction-time task, where reward magnitude and probability are both manipulated, 
showed that ventral striatal activation dominantly reflected expected gain magnitude, while medial PFC 
was sensitive to both magnitude and probability (Knutson et al., 2005) as its activity was correlated with 
anticipated gain magnitude times probability so it reflected expected value (Figure 1.14). 
 
 
Figure 1.14: Neural activation correlated with expected value (anticipated monetary gain magnitude times probability) 









Figure 1.15: Activity in LIP during oculomotor choice task where the target colors are associated with different reward 
probabilities. (a) Monkeys fixate on the central cross. Go cue is the dimming of this cross. The reward (a drop of juice) 
from choosing a color depends on the history of previous actions. (b) Average activity in LIP neurons. Blue curves 
denote trials in which the monkey made a choice into the neuron’s response field. Green curves denote trials in which 
the choice was outside of the response field. Thicker lines indicate that the chosen target has a higher associated 
expected reward. Here, LIP neuron’s activity is a function of the expected value of the chosen targets rather than 
stimulus coherence (Sugrue et al, 2004). 
 
Lateral Intraparietal Area (LIP): In a study where values of target colors were different, neural activity in 
LIP was shown to be increasing with the relative value of the target in the response field (Figure 1.15), 
which is very similar to neural activity shown in Figure 7a but value of the target determines the time-
course of the activity instead of evidence strength (Sugrue et al., 2004). Thus, it is suggested that LIP is 
encoding something akin to the relative value signal (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004). While representation of 
value is “absolute” in OFC, as suggested by its menu-invariant property, it is “relative” (each neuron is 
modulated by the ratio of the value of the associated location/action to the total value of all 
locations/actions.) in the parietal cortex. Also LIP encoding of value in spatial coordinates shows that color-
based information is transformed to action-based which facilitates mapping value to action selection.   
 
1.3.2  Modeling 
 
In EDM a prominent computational model based on reinforcement learning (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) 
suggests that value of an option is learned by reinforcement and updated according to prediction error, 
scaled with learning rate. There are also studies that try to integrate subjective valuation and preference into 
the sequential sampling models that are generally used in the PDM field (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; 
Usher and McClelland, 2004). These studies aim to explain more than the over-learned sensorimotor tasks 
that are generally investigated by process models in PDM literature. 
 
It has been theorized that value-based decisions rely on the evidence accumulation mechanisms as well 






and Ratcliff, 2013), and the framework of drift-diffusion models (DDM) of binary response selection is 
utilized for modeling of value-based choice.   
 
 
Figure 1.16: a) Subjects fixate at the center. Then they are presented with two items and given as much time as they 
want to make their choice. b) A relative decision value (RDV) evolves over time with a slope that is biased toward 
the item that is being fixated. The slope dictates the average rate of change of the RDV, but there is also an error term 
drawn from a Gaussian distribution. When the RDV hits the barrier a choice is made for the corresponding item. The 
shaded vertical regions represent the item being fixated (Krajbich et al. 2010). 
 
A model of value-based choice has incorporated the shifting of attention from option to option  (Krajbich 
et al. 2010). In the task subjects are presented with images of two food items (that they had preference rated 
on a -10 to +10 scale earlier) and asked to choose (without any time or gaze constraint) the one they would 
prefer to eat after the experiment (Figure 1.16). According to the proposed model, visual fixations on the 
options affect the DDM value comparison process by introducing a temporary drift bias toward the fixated 
item. This drift bias in turn leads to a choice bias for items that are fixated on more. Findings suggest that 
the first target to fixate on is randomly chosen and fixation durations are drawn from an equal distribution. 
Reward value associated with the currently fixated item is retrieved from memory and accumulated 
analogous to sensory evidence accumulation in DDM. Choice happens when either of the thresholds 
associated with options is reached. It is shown that if the independently measured values of the two items 
in a trial are similar, so the net difference between alternatives is small, the choice is difficult and reaction 
times are longer. Krajbich and Rangel (2011) study shows the findings of this study can be extended to 3-
option version of the task. Regarding when and to which option the attention should shift, basal ganglia and 
uncertainty reduction mechanism are suggested to be implicated (Gottlieb et al., 2014).  
 
In another study which had both VDM (value-based decision making) and PDM trials, subjects are asked 
to choose which item they preferred to eat at the end of the experiment in VDM trials, and they are asked 
to choose which item covered more of the black background in PDM trials (Polania et al., 2014). In this 
comparative approach, it is found that in both PDM and VDM, model-predicted neural evidence 
accumulation (EA) signals were present in gamma oscillations (PDM: 48–66 Hz, VDM: 46–64 Hz) for 
sensors located over parietal regions and but for only VDM trials gamma activity (46–62 Hz) of sensors 
over fronto-polar regions and beta oscillations (18–20 Hz) over fronto-central regions reflected evidence 
accumulation process. Also it is suggested that the strong fronto-parietal gamma-band coherence for VDM 
reflects a facilitated communication between these cortical areas, such as assigning value to choice options, 
integrating different aspects of choice. 
 
1.4   Value-Biased Perceptual Decision Making:  
A major idea is that information related to stimulus identity and stimulus value are represented as 
a common neural currency to be evaluated for outcome behavior (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010). 
Although there are findings related to this idea, the location and mechanism of this proposed integration 






decision, subjects make choices in favor of this option more frequently and faster (Feng, 2009). 
Analogously, if one option has a greater prior probability, behavior is biased in a similar way - subjects 
choose this option more frequently and with faster response times (Mulder et al., 2012).  
Different models account for such biases in behavior in terms of different underlying mechanisms. Most 
prominently, two mechanisms of bias are compared. One of them is a bias in evidence accumulation rate 
or “drift rate bias” and the other one is pre-stimulus activation of response channels, expressed in models 
as a starting-point bias toward the more valuable alternative (Ratcliff, 1985). One theory for how such 
starting point bias could be created is that evidence accumulation in favor of that alternative may be started 
earlier, as in the two-stage processing hypothesis suggested by Diederich and Busemeyer (2006). 
Alternatively, value coding areas’ higher activity may simply raise the baseline activity in bounded decision 
formation neurons before the stimulus is presented. In a memory-guided saccade task, striatal and parietal 
cortex neurons are shown to reflect value of options before stimulus presentation, supporting the former 
mechanism theoretically (Kawagoe et al., 1998). Meanwhile, drift rate bias may be implemented as a gain 
increase in favor of the more rewarding alternative or more frequent sampling of evidence regarding the 
higher value option (Cheadle, Samuel, et al. 2014). Another suggested mechanism is scaling attention by 
the potential value of different stimuli to enhance the ability to detect and discriminate stimuli of high 
behavioral utility, which will be mentioned in the attention section. I return to these model variants in the 
modelling section below. 
 
         
1.4.1  Neural Circuits: 
A long line of neurophysiological work has reported value-biased neural activity. In one study, for example, 
the activity of a group of caudate neurons that are encoding eye movements (saccades) in one “preferred” 
direction reflected the value associated with that action in that trial, before the stimulus presentation (shown 
by vertical line in Figure 1.17). So when these neurons’ preferred direction is yielding higher reward, their 
activity was as shown in “best condition”, and if it was associated with low reward, it was as shown in 
“worst condition”. This firing is suggested to reflect valuation of the default action (Lauwereyns et al., 
2002). So the choice bias towards high value option when low value is cued, is explained by the monkey’s 




Figure 1.17: Average firing rates of caudate neurons in monkeys that encode the value of saccades in one “preferred” 
direction. In trials where this direction generates higher reward on average (Best condition), increase in firing starts 






Anticipatory increases in firing rates are absent in trials where the “preferred ” direction receives the lower reward on 




In fact, when reward values that are associated with saccading to targets are increased, several brain areas 
are found to show increased activity, such as LIP (Sugrue et al., 2004), dorsolateral PFC (Leon & Shadlen, 
1999), the supplementary eye fields (Amador et al.,2000), the caudate nucleus (Watanabe et al., 2003), SN 
pars reticulata (Sato and Hikosaka, 2002), anterior cingulate cortex (Ito et al., 2003), and superior colliculus 
(Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003). Enhanced activity in these areas is suggested to reflect the bias in decision 
mechanism which favors saccading to the high-value target.  
 
While OFC is suggested to encode the values of options per se, independent of the associated visual features 
or motor-plan, LIP neurons reflect the relative value of options (Platt and Glimcher, 1997) as a modulation 
of activity encoding the spatial location of the visual stimulus or the eye movement necessary to express 
the choice (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008). Thus it appears that OFC encodes the abstract value of 
goods, and more downstream areas such as LIP integrates this information into sensory-motor processing 
by scaling neuronal responses to sensory stimuli and motor plans by their expected value, thus modulating 
the likelihood of reaching the threshold for a choice (Gold and Shadlen, 2001). This value-biased activity 
in sensorimotor circuits is a very plausible candidate neural mechanism to explain behavioral biases in 
perceptual decisions. However, very surprisingly, only one study so far has actually recorded single neurons 
in a sensorimotor area during an actual perceptual decision task (Rorie et al., 2010). In the study, two-
alternative, forced-choice, motion discrimination saccade task with multiple reward contingencies (both 
targets high reward, both targets low reward, or asymmetric reward) was utilized during 
electrophysiological recording of LIP neurons of monkeys. LIP neurons were found to encode absolute 
value, relative value and motion coherence of the target in their RFs besides encoding behavioral choice. 
Further, the neurons’ sensitivity to sensory evidence and relative reward value appeared to be additive. In 
order to unite the findings related to LIP’s role, it has been suggested by other researchers that LIP remaps 
abstract valuation to concrete action by representing value in spatial terms so it functions as a saliency map 
of visual space (Bisley & Goldberg, 2003).  
 
In the fMRI study of Summerfield and Koechlin (2010) where they used a motion discrimination task, 
authors showed that while extrastriate visual cortex activity was correlated with sensory evidence, decision 
variable comprising both momentary evidence and value was correlated with the BOLD signal in parietal 
and prefrontal cortices, supporting the idea that value affects higher levels of processing and not sensory 
representations. In another study (Mulder 2012), authors showed that when behavior is modeled with a 
starting point bias, subjects with a larger proportional increase in starting point showed higher BOLD signal 
in the following frontoparietal regions: right superior frontal gyrus (SFG), right middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) when the task involved prior 
probability manipulation, and although it was weaker they showed higher BOLD signal in orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), the hippocampus and occipital lobe in addition to the aforementioned frontoparietal regions 
when the task involved potential payoff manipulation. 
 
Human and non-human primate research has also shown bias effects in regions involved in early processes 
of saccadic eye movement, suggesting bottom-up processing from the value representation (Lauwereyns et 
al., 2002; Serences, 2008; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008; So and Stuphorn, 2010). For example, one 
study implicated value bias in early sensory areas (Serences and Saproo, 2010). They utilized a forced 
choice paradigm with a variable-interval payoff schedule to dynamically manipulate relative value of two 
differently oriented (CW or CCW) grating stimuli. These authors showed that value modulates the relative 






profiles, such that voxels associated with high-value stimuli were more sharply tuned to the critical stimulus 
feature (orientation) than voxels associated with low-value stimuli; and the activity in these voxels was 
stronger for high value option. This value bias in early visual areas is suggested to increase discriminability 
and promote faster sensory evidence accumulation in favor of more valuable stimuli.  
 
In another study (Cicmil et al., 2015), authors aimed to discriminate where do reward signals interact with 
the perceptual decision-making pathway; specifically, whether expected reward modulates a sensory 
representation stage (corresponding to a drift change) or does it affect the integration stage (corresponding 
to a bound height change). In the study, monkeys received rewards for correctly identifying a three-
dimensional cylinder’s direction of rotation, and microstimulation was applied to specific groups of V5/MT 
neurons on some of the trials during visual stimulus presentation. They found that the size of the 
microstimulation effect was modulated by the size of the reward (microstimulation’s effect of biasing the 
choice is decreased with increasing reward), and with a bounded evidence-accumulation model, these 
results were best explained by an effect of reward on neuronal representations of sensory evidence, in 
addition to an effect on the integration stage, concluding that reward information is integrated with the 
decision process in both phases.  
 
There are several potential areas and mechanisms for the reward signal to affect sensory cortex. 
Dopaminergic (DA) neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra pars compacta 
(SNc) might influence activity in visual cortex via direct projections to early areas of visual cortex (Devoto 
and Flore 2006). Also indirect DA signals that relayed through the striatum and then to frontal and parietal 
cortex play an important role in regulating value-related changes in early visual cortex (Barraclough et al. 
2004). Also cortical targets of reward signals—such as oculomotor neurons in frontal and parietal cortex—
are ideally situated to send modulatory feedback signals to earlier sensory areas so that the cortical 
representation of high-value stimulus features can be enhanced (Bisley and Goldberg 2003). Also locus 
coeruleus sends long-range norepinephrine projections that have been implicated in modulating activity in 
sensory cortices in response to highly relevant stimuli (Aston-Jones and Cohen 2005).  
 
Glimcher (2009) argues that in the light of current findings the ventral striatum and the medial prefrontal 
cortex are particularly implicated in coding of subjective value as a final common representation to guide 
the subsequent choice process. As I mentioned, parietal areas receive both direct and indirect projections 
from the valuation areas and project directly to the movement control areas. Specifically, LIP is shown to 
code for relative subjective value of option in an action frame (Dorris and Glimcher 2004) and the activity 
in LIP, FEF and SC areas are shown to reflect the probability of a particular action. These anatomical 
features and activity in reference to choice suggests that these areas may be where value-biases take place 
and modulate the sensory-motor choice. 
 
1.4.2  Modeling: 
 
The biases in accuracy and response time due to prior probability and potential payoff  has classically been  
accounted for in models implicating either a change in decision criterion or change in rate of accumulation. 
According to the bound-change hypothesis (Edwards, 1965; Rapoport and Burkheimer, 1971), the payoffs 
bias the bounds, shortening the distance between starting position and bound for favored option (Link and 
Heath, 1975; Ratcliff, 1978) . An analogous version called starting-point bias states that the starting point 
of evidence accumulation changes. A suggested neural mechanism is that parietal integrator neurons are 
biased early on in the diffusion process, with their baseline firing rates brought closer to threshold before 
evidence accumulation has begun (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010). In drift-change hypothesis, (Ashby, 
1983; Ratcliff, 1981), the bias affects the way the increment in evidence is interpreted [v(t)= u(t) +bias]. So 






processing hypothesis (Diederich, 1997), a valuation system that learns through repeated sampling of the 
environment, stores the values of actions and/or goods; a choice system uses these values to select (from 
amongst a current choice set) a single option; and a motor control system executes the physical responses 
dictated by the choice. The Payoff attribute is processed first and then when the sensory stimulus is 
presented, the sensory evidence attribute is processed as accumulation. An idea following this hypothesis 
states that under short deadlines, subjects use an internal deadline to keep up with the task requirement of 
making any response within the allotted time which would depend on the prior information about payoffs. 
In more lenient deadlines, subjects utilize decision bound crossing with accumulated sensory evidence. So 
the behavior depends on the deadline and the subject’s particular orientation to reward maximization or 
accuracy-maximization strategy. While economic optimal behavior entails reward maximization, subjects 
might behave in accuracy-oriented way as well (Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.18: A) Possible effects of bias on choice behavior in drift-diffusion model. When prior information is valid 
for the choice at hand, subjects will have faster and more correct choices, whereas invalid information results in slower 
and less correct choices compared with choices where no information is provided (neutral). These effects can be 
explained by changes in the starting point or the drift rate of the accumulation process. B) Expected effects of bias on 
RT and accuracy data for choices with valid, neutral and invalid cues. Drift rate bias and starting point bias have 
different predictions on RTs (Mulder et al, 2012).    
 
One important difference between the models is that in the drift-rate bias account, effects of payoff 
information continue to affect the decision process throughout its lifetime, while in the criterion or starting-
point bias account, payoffs’ effect is set prior to evidence accumulation. The two basic starting point bias 
and drift-rate bias models have similar predictions for some behavioral effects such as faster and more 
correct choices for the higher- paying/higher probability option. But the two accounts diverge in other 
behavioral predictions. While bound change/starting point change predicts fast errors when less 
probable/less paying option is cued, drift-rate change predicts slower errors (Figure 1.18). Conversely, 
starting point bias predicts slower error responses when a more probable/higher paying option is cued and 
drift rate bias predicts fast errors in this case. Moreover, in the drift rate bias model sensory information is 
the main determinant of choices when signal levels are high, but economic information will bias choices 
more when sensation is weak (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010). 






Most findings in the literature are in favor of the starting point hypothesis (Laming, 1968; Link and Heath, 
1975; Ratcliff, 1985; Ratcliff et al., 1999; Voss et al., 2004;Palmer et al., 2005; Bogacz et al., 2006; 
Forstmann et al., 2010; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2010) with the observation that errors are fast when 
low-paying/less probable option is cued and errors are slower in high-paying trials. However, the difficulty 
of trials were fixed in some of these studies and drift rate bias would have been utilized as a more optimal 
strategy if the deadline or sensory evidence reliability was changed (Bogacz et al., 2006; Moran, 2015).  
 
For example, in Mulder et al. 2012, authors found that the behavioral pattern of errors is consistent with the 
starting point bias model, where errors in low paying/low probability trials were faster than errors in high 
probability/high paying trials. By fitting the drift diffusion model (DDM) to data, they showed that prior 
probability and potential payoff manipulations are both better accounted for by a change in starting point 
rather than in drift rate. In Summerfield and Koechlin 2010, authors showed that economic information 
biased fast choices more than slow choices suggesting the integration of value with sensory information is 
early in decision process. By simulation using an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck model, they showed that starting 
point change toward more valuable bound captured the influence of economic information while drift rate 
change simulation especially failed to capture the false alarm rate in the fastest 25% of responses. In the 
study of Rorie et al (2010), LIP activity was consistent with an offset of the starting point of accumulation 
as in two-stage models, and that the data do not give a good fit to drift modulation by reward model.  
 
Lee & Wang (2009) propose that reward-bias effect can be modeled with modulatory neural connections 
on the sensory inputs to LIP’s evidence integrator neural populations in the biophysically plausible model 
of Wang (2002) (Figure 1.19). Input synapses are updated according to a reward dependent Hebbian 
learning rule, so the input strengths for the competing neural groups (A and B) of the decision network vary 
from trial to trial, leading to adaptive dynamics of choice behavior. They simulate the matching behavior 
in a dynamic foraging task, in which a subject makes successive choices adaptively in a stochastic 
environment and the behavior in a game-theoretic task that involves dynamic interplay between decision 
agents. Their findings are in line with behavioral and neurophysiological observations of Sugrue et al., 2004 
and Barraclough et al., 2004 studies. The model qualitatively reproduces neural activity observed in LIP 
that is modulated by the values of the response options (Figure 1.20, compare with Figure 1.15)   
      
 








Figure 1.20: Activity of model neurons as a function of the input synaptic strengths which encode the values (rewards) 
of choice options in a matching task. The choices corresponding to the neurons’ preferred (red) or non-preferred (blue) 
target. In addition, trials are subdivided into four groups according to the difference between the strength of synapses 
to the two competing neural populations (Lee and Wang, 2009).  
 
Recently, Noorbaloochi et al (2015) explained payoff biases in an urgent, time-constrained two-alternative 
perceptual decision task using a novel fast guess model. It was found that in some of the trials, there were 
fast responses to the high paying option with a corresponding early, initial deflection in relative motor 
preparation toward the high paying option indexed in the lateralised readiness potential (LRP). According 
to their fast guess model, in some of the trials, another accumulator (fast guess), that is launched for the 
high payoff option on more of the trials due to payoff bias, is launched in competition with the two 
accumulators that are corresponding to two alternative options. Their modeling work supported the fast 
guess account over starting point and drift rate bias accounts suggesting that payoff information is 
incorporated in the decision-making process through a probabilistic fast guess process that races with the 
stimulus-driven processes. 
 
1.5   Value and Attention: 
The concepts, representations and mechanisms associated with value processing are intertwined 
with those of attention (Maunsell 2004). Attention is a concept encompassing a variety of mechanisms such 
as alerting, orienting and executive attention (Posner, 1971). A well-known expression of selective attention 
is the boost in amplitude of sensory neural responses to a stimulus when it is attended compared to when 
unattended (Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Treue, 2004; Martinez-Trujillo et al., 2004; Treue & Martinez-
Trujillo, 1999). Attention mechanisms are considered to be either top-down (endogenous) and bottom-up 
(exogenous) in nature. While top-down attention can be defined as volitional and goal-driven, implicating 
frontal cortex and basal ganglia; bottom-up attention is stimulus-driven, where salient sensory inputs 
capture the processing capacity, implicating parietal and temporal cortices as well as the brainstem (Posner 
and Petersen,1989Rosen et al., 1999). In top-down sensitivity control, higher order areas are thought to 
regulate signal intensity in the task related areas with feedback loops (Knudsen, 2007) which also influence 
bottom-up processing mechanisms. For example, the study of Rao and Ballard (1999) proposes a model 
with top-down feedback connections from higher order areas to lower order visual areas which carry likely 
predictions of natural images to guide visual processing to be more efficient. Although they focused on the 
candidate neural mechanisms in visual cortex, they show that this feedback based control on visual 
processing is very similar to the mechanism of attentional modulation of visual areas. 
As we mentioned, dopamine (DA) neurons in the midbrain have been shown to encode prediction errors of 






(Robbins and Everitt, 1996; Koepp et al., 1998; Salamone and Correa, 2002; Wise, 2002) and attention 
(Spanagel and Weiss, 1999; Redgrave et al., 1999). It is shown that when the value of a target is increased, 
activity of neurons associated with that target is also increased in some task related visual orienting areas 
such as LIP (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Coe et al., 2002; Sugrue et al., 2004), the supplementary eye-fields 
(Amador et al., 2000),  the superior colliculus (Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003), and the caudate nucleus 
(Kawagoe et al., 1998; Watanabe et al., 2003) which bias and/or reflect the biased decision-related 
processes in favor of valuable stimulus. This value modulation is also interpreted as attentional orientation 
considering the saliency map feature of these areas (Goldberg et al., 2002) and following the findings of 
several studies showing that neurons in most of these areas are sensitive to attention (Gottlieb et al., 1998), 
and lesions of these areas are associated with deficits in attention. So as pointed out in Maunsell (2004), 
reward modulation of neuronal activity in brain areas associated with visual orienting might actually reflect 
changes in attention, and vice versa (Maunsell, 2004). As detailed in this article, since reward contingencies 
are the only parameter manipulated in the reward modulation of neural activity experiments (e.g. Platt & 
Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004), it is not possible to dissociate reward modulation from attentional 
modulation. In an attempt to disentangle them, in Bendiksby and Platt’s study (2006), the target to saccade 
to and the cue for allowing the saccade were in different locations of the visual field, so while the monkeys’ 
gaze was fixated centrally, they had to attend to the cue location to make a saccade to target location. The 
task is run for two different reward magnitudes to also see the effect of reward. They found that reward 
modulated the activity of LIP neurons with RFs at cue locations, showing that LIP neurons encoded reward 
for attended areas even if they are not in the action frame and suggesting a general motivational role for 
reward, rather than particularly action-based neural modulation. The study actually does not fully answer 
the question raised by Maunsell since the attention mechanism under investigation in this task is coded in 
spatial terms while reward modulates the magnitude of activity. Although they succeeded in separating 
reward and orienting attention to a particular stimulus, general arousal and higher attentiveness as in alerting 
attention due to reward is not ruled out. However, it shows that spatial attention and reward based 
motivational state can both be encoded in a group of LIP neurons.  
 
One of the main reasons it is difficult to differentiate reward and attention constructs is that reward 
associated stimuli generally capture attention even when not task relevant. Anderson et al (2011) showed 
that a formerly rewarding stimulus feature (color) that is learned in a training session caused significant and 
persistent distraction (increased reaction time) during a test session in which subjects are asked to find the 
different shape stimulus where the color feature was task-irrelevant. This value-based attentional capture 
finding is also in line with the reaction time and accuracy bias observed for high value stimulus when the 
actual task goal was to select low-value option in asymmetric reward schedule perceptual decision tasks. 
Also although the authors comment that these results violate the predictions of both a salience-driven and 
goal-driven account of attentional capture, reinforcement learning is argued to change saliency of a stimulus 
(Peck et al., 2009) and context dependency of RL and its extinction should be ruled out to confirm this 
comment (Hickey et al 2010).  
 
In a similar vein in investigating how reward influences attention, Peck et al (2009) showed that reward-
context predictor cue’s location biased attention in a spatially specific manner, as it attracted attention to its 
location and evoked sustained excitation in LIP if it predicts a rewarding trial; and it repelled attention from 
its location and evoked sustained inhibition in LIP if it predicts an unrewarding trial, although the task 
demand was to saccade to the brightened target which did not have any relation with reward-context 
predictor cue. Findings show that in this task reward-context information is coded in spatial terms, and thus 
it interferes with the spatial attention required for task demands, resulting in decreased accuracy and 
increased latency when no-reward-trial cue is presented. Also it is evidenced that LIP neurons encoded the 
reward valence of a stimulus even when this valence was not aligned with the reward of the saccade (action-







Figure 1.21: Spatial effects of the reward cue on pre-saccadic activity (congruent: black; incongruent: gray) (Peck et 
al 2009). 
 
1.6   Summary: 
In this section we discussed the sensory, motor, and deliberation phases of decision making and we 
focused on perceptual and value-based decision making mechanisms in order to understand how value plays 
into perceptual decisions. It is clear that value forms an inherent part of all decisions. Value modulates 
neural activity in different levels. In sensory areas, value-related modulation in neuronal activity is shown 
to promote selective processing of high-value stimuli. In frontal cortex, neurons representing abstract value 
could contribute directly to the selection of one among multiple available goods based on subjective 
preference. And in sensory-motor areas, value modulations promote the selection of one particular action 
among others in order to maximize reward(/rate). In contrast with these widespread, varied neural effects 
of value, models of value-biased decisions have tended to almost exclusively favour one very basic 
mechanism of starting-point biases, and drift rate biases are rarely if ever implicated. The goal of my PhD 
was to combine neurophysiology with behavioral modelling to dig deeper and  understand the mechanisms 




















Chapter 2  BEHAVIORAL AND ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL INDICES OF VALUE 





This chapter describes the main study of the thesis, in which we used a rapid color discrimination task to 
examine value-biased fast perceptual decisions where the values associated with the options were unequal. 
This study has already been published (Afacan-Seref et al 2018, Current Biology). We aimed to determine 
the behavioral and electrophysiological indices of how value biases split-second perceptual decisions and 
the possible mechanisms underlying the process by developing models that allowed for nonstationary drift 
rate dynamics which could be compared against standard stationary models and could be validated by 





2.2.1 Participants:  
Fifteen healthy, and naïve to the experiment, subjects (7 female) were recruited, ranging in age from 21 to 
35 years old (mean=25 years). $12 per hour compensation was given to the subjects and they could earn up 
to $12 additionally depending on the points they earned (1 pts = $0.0044). The experiments took place in a 
dark, sound-attenuated booth. Participants were seated 57 cm from a CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 85 
Hz and resolution of 600 x 800. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on a small square (0.5o of 
visual angle) in the center of the screen for the duration of each trial, and eye position was monitored with 
a remote eye tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research, 1000Hz).  
 
2.2.2 Task and Stimuli:  
The canonical version of rapid value-biased color-discrimination (BCV = Bimanual Color-Value) task is 
utilized (Figure 2.1A). First, participants are instructed about the color-value association in the beginning 
of each block (e.g green is 40 pts and cyan is 5 point or green is 5 points and cyan is 40 points). Then each 
trial began with a centrally placed, light gray fixation square (brightness level 215, 89 cd/m2) presented on 
a darker gray background (brightness 128, 29 cd/m2). Once fixation was maintained for 400-450ms, 
equiluminant green and cyan “targets” (filled circles with a diameter of 2o) were presented 8o to the right 
and left of fixation on the vertical midline. The placement of colors indicated the stimulus-action mapping 
for the upcoming sensorimotor decision (as well as action-value mapping since the colors have already been 
associated with value), and was pseudorandomized across trials. After 777 or 824 ms (randomly interleaved 
to reduce 10-Hz alpha-ringing from preceding target onset), the fixation square changed its color to match 
one of the two targets. To obtain a reward, subjects had to press a button with the index finger of the hand 
corresponding to the location of the cued target color within a strict deadline of 325 ms. The two color 
alternatives were associated with differing reward amounts received if correctly responded to on time. 
Participants each completed 6 blocks of 120 trials of this task. The color-to-value mapping remained 
constant within each block, and was switched after three blocks with the initial mapping counterbalanced 






aborted and a message, “Keep your eyes on fixation!” was printed on the screen. At the end of the trial, a 
short feedback message was displayed indicating whether the subject was correct (‘Nice!’) and the points 
gained, or that no points were awarded either because the response was initiated before the cue (‘Too early, 
wait for cue’), occurred shortly after the deadline (‘Too slow’), or more than 550 ms after the deadline 
(‘Way too slow’), or the incorrect response was chosen (‘Wrong way’). In the training period before the 
actual experiment, participants practiced the task for 4 blocks of 120 trials, with the response deadline 
starting at 450ms and decreasing to 325 ms by the fourth block.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: A) Bimanual Color-Value Task. B) Behavioral Data. 
 
2.2.3 Behavioral data analysis: 
We measured reaction times (RT) relative to cue onset and response accuracy for the two conditions of 
high- and low-value cues. One of the 15 subjects took a qualitatively different approach to the task than the 
rest, almost completely ignoring the sensory information in the cue. This was reflected in an extremely high 
low-value error rate (72%), extremely low median reaction time (215 ms), and extremely high number of 
anticipatory movements (RT<50 ms on 56 out of 720 trials), each of which was classed as an outlier by the 
criterion of falling more than two inter-quartile ranges beyond the upper/lower quartile. This subject was 
therefore excluded from further analysis. For the remaining 14 subjects, anticipatory actions (RT < 50 ms) 
were made on 1.0 ± 2.0 % of trials and “way too late” responses (RT>550 ms) on a further 1.2 ± 1.0 % of 
trials. These trials were excluded from analysis. Trials on which the deadline for obtaining rewards was 
missed but a response was made before the trial’s end at 550 ms were included, because these represent an 
integral part of the pattern of responding in the task and no physical change occurred on screen before trial 
end. To compute RT distributions for plotting, we divided trials into non-overlapping RT bins of width 
23.5-ms ranging from 50–550 ms (Figure 2.1B). For conditional accuracy functions (CAF) we calculated 
the proportion of correct trials within each of these RT bins and plotted response accuracy over the bins’ 
mean RTs.   
 
2.2.4 Modeling: 
In the first behavioral modeling analysis, we compared 4 bounded diffusion models, a 2x2 set where we 
crossed the two alternative mechanisms for value biasing (starting-point versus drift rate bias) with two 
alternative mechanisms for producing incorrect responses of shorter RT than correct ones (‘‘fast errors’’; 
starting point variability and increasing evidence strength). All models shared the basic principle of 
bounded accumulation of noisy evidence, with the dynamics of the one-dimensional decision variable (DV), 
x, described by the discrete difference equation: 
 







where dt is the discrete time increment, E(t) specifies the expectation of the differential evidence and thus 
the momentary drift rate of the DV at time step t, and N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) refers to Gaussian noise with zero 
mean and variance s2dt. All four models had a single ‘‘non-decision time’’ parameter to account for additive 
delays due to processes other than the accumulation-to-bound process and a single bound parameter, with 
the noise level anchored at s = 0.1, relative to which all other parameters are scaled. 
 
In the Starting Point Bias model with variable starting point (SPB-VS), and the Drift Rate Bias model with 
variable starting point (DRB-VS), the evidence function E(t) was a step function, whose height for a given 
condition equated to the stationary drift rate. In the Starting Point Bias model with increasing evidence 
(SPB-IE), and the Drift Rate Bias model with increasing evidence (DRB-IE), the evidence function E(t) 
was a linear function with positive slope, corresponding to non-stationary, growing drift rate, and these 
models had no starting point variability. In the SPB models, the starting point of accumulation was shifted 
closer to the bound of the higher paying option and drift rate was constrained to be equal across value 
conditions. In the DRB models, the two value conditions were allowed to have different drift rates, and the 
starting point was constrained to be zero on average. The SPB-VS model was governed by: 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + d*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= zB + rand1*sz ;         (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + d*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= - zB + rand1*sz ;       (Low-value cue) 
which proceeded until either bound b (correct) or -b (error) was crossed, at which point non-decision time 
tnd was added to compute the full RT for the trial. Adding tnd at the end of the decision process is no 
different than interposing it between cue onset and the beginning of decision formation in terms of 
behavioral fitting, but it conveniently allows us to refer to time t as starting from accumulation onset (t=0) 
in the present model descriptions. This same stopping rule and additive time component were implemented 
identically in all models, and the simulation time resolution was fixed at dt=1 ms. For convenience we use 
the term ‘rand1’ to denote a uniform random variable over the range {-1,1}. The starting point bias zB was 
implemented as a symmetric shift upwards (+ zB) and downwards (- zB) from the midpoint between bounds 
(x=0) for high and low value cues, respectively. The SPB-VS model thus had 5 free parameters: tnd, b, zB, 
starting point variability half-range sz, and a constant drift rate E(t) = d.  
The DRB-VS model was governed by: 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (d + dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= 0 + rand1*sz ;     (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (d - dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= 0 + rand1*sz ;     (Low-value cue) 
Here, the starting point was on average midway between the bounds but variable across trials, and high and 
low value cues had different drift rates given by d + dB and d - dB respectively, such that d is the midpoint 
between the two and dB relates to a symmetric bias from that midpoint. (Note the fit was conducted with 
two separate drift rates dH and dL which later were translated to these midpoint and bias drift rate 
parameters for clarity of exposition). This model thus had 5 free parameters: tnd, b, sz, d, and dB.  
The SPB-IE model was governed by: 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + c*t*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= zB ;               (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + c*t*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= - zB ;             (Low-value cue) 
so that drift rate increased linearly with positive slope c over time, i.e., E(t) = c*t. zB again quantified the 
symmetric starting point bias from x=0. This model had 4 free parameters: tnd, b, zB, and drift rate 
growth rate c.  
Finally, The DRB-IE model was governed by: 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (dB + c*t)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ,             x(0)= 0 ; (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (- dB + c*t)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) , x(0)= 0 ;  (Low-value cue) 
so that the linearly increasing drift rate additionally had an offset dB in the direction of higher value, i.e., 
E(t) = ±dB + c*t. This model thus also had 4 free parameters: tnd, b, c, and dB. This DRB-IE model has the 
unique feature that the decision variable tends initially to be launched towards the choice bound of the high-
value option, and as time passes is increasingly driven by the growing sensory evidence influence captured 






growth rate c and bound b governs when and in what proportion of trials the decision variable hits one of 
the two bounds before this shift in influence can occur. 
 
A neurally plausible basis for a biased and dynamically changing drift rate is the value-based modulation 
of sensory responses of neurons tuned to the color alternatives, which respond initially non-selectively but 
with increasing color-selectivity over time. We implemented this in the Value Modulated Sensory Response 
(VMSR) model, whose DV dynamics are governed by: 
        x(t) =  x(t-1) + E(t)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ;       x(0)= zB + rand1*sz ;               (High-value cue) 
       x(t) =  x(t-1) + E(t)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ;       x(0)= - zB + rand1*sz ;             (Low-value cue) 
where in this case the evidence E(t) is the difference in activity between the neural population coding for 
the presented cue color (‘‘preferred’’ response Rp), and the population coding for the color not presented 
(‘‘unpreferred’’ response Ru): 
                                             E(t) = (1+B)*Rp(t) - (1-B)*Ru(t)  
Here, a modulatory bias B is applied which is positive for high-value cues (B = MB) and negative for low-
value cues (B = - MB). For parsimony, we take the preferred response under neutral conditions to be a step 
function, 
  Rp(t) = Rm,  t>=0 
Rp(t) = 0,  t<0 
and the unpreferred response to be an equal-sized step-up followed by a decrease to zero according to a 
cumulative Weibull function, 
Ru(t) = Rm*exp(-(t/tau)^k) ,  t>=0 
Ru(t) = 0,     t<0 
where Rm is the response magnitude and tau and k dictate the timing and shape of the drop-off to zero. We 
chose a cumulative Weibull function here so that both the duration of the initial non-color-selective phase 
of the response and the steepness with which selectivity then develops are free to be determined by the 
behavioral fit. Because Rp(t) and Ru(t) are initially commensurate when they begin, with the unpreferred 
response falling after a short time, when biased with a negative B < 0, the differential evidence E(t) will 
initially start out negative and gradually increase and switch to positive values, thus generating the dynamic 
shift of influence and characteristic ‘‘turn-around’’ effect associated with our biased, increasing evidence 
model (DRB-IE; Figure 2.3D). The VMSR model thus has 8 parameters in total: non-decision time tnd, 
bound b, Response magnitude Rm, Weibull parameters tau and k, modulatory bias MB, and starting point 
bias zB, and variability sz. 
 
Finally, we constructed a ‘‘Standard Dual-bias’’ model for a fair comparison against the VMSR model in 
terms of capturing both behavior and neural decision signal dynamics, using a combination of mechanisms 
included in previous work using conventional, stationary-evidence diffusion models. The DV dynamics for 
this model was governed by: 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (di + dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ;       x(0)= zB + rand1*sz ;               (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (di - dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ;        x(0)= - zB + rand1*sz ;             (Low-value cue) 
where in this case on any given trial the drift rate di, which is constant over time within that trial, is taken 
from a normal distribution di = N(d, sd), and the non-decision time takes on a different value for high-value 
responses, tndH, than for low-value responses, tndL. The Standard Dual-bias model thus had 8 free 
parameters: tndH, tndL, b, zB, sz, mean drift rate d, bias in drift rate dB and across-trial variability in drift 
rate sd. 
 
2.2.5 Model Fitting and Comparison: 
All of the above models were fit to the behavioral data by Monte-Carlo simulation methods on a subject by 
subject basis, using a SIMPLEX routine (Nelder and Mead, 1965) implemented in the MATLAB function 






value of each model indicates the goodness of fit between simulated and actual behavioral data for each 
model. It is calculated as 
                                            
where pv,o,q and v,o,q are the observed and predicted proportions of responses in bin q of outcome o 
(correct/error) of condition v (high-value/low-value cue), respectively. nv is the number of valid trials per 
value condition. q indexes six RT bins divided by the quantiles [0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9]. Thus, the model fit 
aims to account for RT distributions and choice probabilities simultaneously. Models with a lower G2 
value fit the data more accurately. We achieved the fit of each model via a 2-step process, in the first of 
which we used a version of the model with the bound b fixed to a value of 1 and the within-trial noise s 
free to vary, for the reason that several parameters such as starting point bias zB and variability sz have 
obvious natural limits determined by this bound, thus facilitating choice of parameter limits for the 
bounded SIMPLEX algorithm. For this first step we generated a large number of random points in a wide 
parameter space and saved the first 100 of them that when simulated produced mean RT and accuracies 
somewhere in the rough vicinity of pooled empirical ones, and carried out an fminsearch with a large 
tolerance (20) and few iterations (max 500) for each of these 100 starting vectors. In the second step we 
identified the parameters of the best fitting model among those 100, translated them to a model version in 
which s was fixed to 0.1 and b free to vary - the most common choice in the literature - by applying the 
appropriate scaling factors, and then refined the fit using a further fminsearch run with smaller tolerance 
(10) and more iterations (5000). 
 
Model comparison across the four reduced-parameter models and between the VMSR and Standard Dual-
bias models was carried out by computing Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which can be derived 
from G2 and penalizes against greater numbers of free parameters: 
                                                                          
where f is the number of free parameters and n is the total number of trials. BIC values are plotted for each 
subject and each of the simplified models, and for the VMSR versus Standard Dual-bias models. 
 
2.2.6 Decision signal simulations from model fits: 
Once the best-fitting parameters were determined for each behavioral model, we simulated 1000 trials for 
each condition and each subject using identical processes as detailed above in order to generate simulated 
average DV trajectories for an illustrative set of conditions/outcomes for each of the four simplified models 
and for the VMSR and Standard Dual-bias models. The purpose of the waveform simulations was to 
provide a concrete demonstration of the qualitative differences between the predictions of the 4 simplified 
models, explicating the dynamic features that should be present at the onset of accumulation in the real 
decision signals given the presence of starting point bias (difference in starting level across cues of 
different value); starting point variability (differences in starting level across low-value cued trials 
resulting in fast/slow correct responses versus errors); and biased, increasing evidence (turn-around effect 
in low-value cues with slow, correct responses). For this purpose it was sufficient to time-lock the 
simulated decision variable to the onset of accumulation and disregard non-decision time. We simulated 
DV trajectories for the four conditions of correct high-value-cued trials, correct low-value-cued trials with 
relatively fast and relatively slow RT, and incorrect low-value-cued trials, because it was in the low-value 
trials that behavioral outcome varied most in speed and accuracy. By design, error trials were those in 
which the DV reached the lower bound. For each trial, the decision variable signal was made to linearly 
drop back to zero over a 60 ms time period following the crossing of a bound, thus complying with what 






necessary for this examination of initial DV starting-level and deflection dynamics. After sorting trials of 
each simulation into four categories (high-value correct, low-value correct fast, low-value correct slow 
and low-value error), we averaged them across subjects. To more comprehensively simulate decision 
signal waveforms representing differential motor preparation (LRP) and motor-independent evidence 
accumulation (CPP) from the more complex VMSR and Standard Dual-bias models we took the additional 
step of allocating a portion of the non-decision time for each subject to the period intervening between 
threshold crossing and response according to the peak latency of the response-locked LRP (52.4 ± 19.3 
ms). The remaining portion of non-decision time was interposed between cue onset and the start of the 
accumulation process. In the case of the VMSR model, this coincided with the start of the idealized sensory 
responses. Each trial’s baseline level of differential motor preparation was determined by the starting point 
of the DV on that trial, arising from the value bias plus variability in starting point. We simulated CPP 
waveforms by tracing the absolute value of the cumulative sensory evidence, without regard to starting 
point shifts due to value or random biases, which we assume enter at the motor preparation level 
(Steinmann et al., 2017). This is based on the fact that the CPP builds with positive polarity regardless of 
which of the two competing decision alternatives is chosen or which is correct, and the consequent 
suggestion that it reflects the activity of two neural populations encoding cumulative evidence for the 
competing alternatives, which each project positive-polarity potentials on the scalp (Kelly & O’Connell, 
2015). Since, despite this assumed summation of two accumulator processes, the CPP reaches a 
stereotyped threshold level at response for urgency-free, continuous monitoring decisions (Kelly & 
O’Connell, 2013; O’Connell et al., 2012), the most parsimonious account of its generating mechanisms is 
that when one population has accumulated evidence, the other remains silent, in which case the CPP 
measured on the scalp would simply reflect the absolute value of differential cumulative evidence. In this 
scheme, the two populations together encode a single, signed quantity of cumulative differential evidence, 
similar to the way each Cartesian axis of a vector representation (e.g., wind velocity) has been proposed 
to be encoded by two neural populations in simple population coding schemes (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; 
Salinas & Abbott, 1994). Whereas we made the LRP fall to zero upon the action-initiating threshold 
crossing, we allowed the CPP to continue reflecting cumulative evidence, based on the assumption that 
responses in this task are often made considerably earlier than the time at which subjects can confidently 
judge the stimulus, thus encouraging continued stimulus evaluation, and that the ultimate threshold is set 
at the motor level rather than directly at the intermediate level of evidence accumulation (Steinemann et 
al., 2017). This continued evidence accumulation was simulated in the same way regardless of response 
correctness. All of these assumptions were implemented identically for the VMSR and Standard Dual-bias 
models. In order to quantitatively compare the VMSR and Standard Dual-bias models in terms of how 
well they captured empirical decision signal dynamics, we computed a correlation coefficient for each 
signal (LRP and CPP) and each individual subject between the real and simulated waveforms, 
concatenating the cue-locked time range of 50 to 350 ms with the response-locked time range of 250 to 0 
ms. We then simply used a paired t test for each signal to test whether the differences in correlation between 
the two models was significantly different than zero. 
 
It is important to note that all assumptions for the model simulations were based on prior proposals 
regarding how evidence accumulation and/or bias are represented in the LRP and CPP. The choice of a 
cumulative Weibull function for the unpreferred neural response was based on the desire to have a short 
but non-zero time period during which the neural populations respond equivalently under neutral 
conditions, after which the unpreferred response decays smoothly to baseline levels (given a value of zero 
without loss of generality). Our aim was to test correspondence in qualitative patterns reflecting value 
biases and increasing evidence and we did not make adjustments to fit the simulated traces to the empirical 
ones with the one exception of apportionment of non-decision time to before and after the accumulation 
process based on individual LRP peak latencies. Thus, the closeness of the match between real and 
simulated LRP and CPP waveforms for the VMSR model was not expected based only on the method of 







2.2.7 Electrophysiological data processing and analysis: 
Continuous electrophysiological data were recorded in DC mode from 97 scalp electrodes with a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz and an online reference at site FCz (ActiCap, Brain Products). All offline analysis was 
performed using in-house scripts written in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA) with raw data-reading, 
channel interpolation and topographic plot functions from the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 
2004). In offline analysis, continuous data were first linearly detrended and low-pass filtered by 
convolution with a 58-tap hanning-windowed sinc function designed to provide a 3-dB corner frequency 
of 41.5 Hz and a local extremum of attenuation coinciding with the mains frequency (60 Hz), while also 
avoiding phase distortion and ringing artifacts (Widmann & Schroger, 2012). Data were epoched from - 
500ms to 1400ms relative to target onset and baseline-corrected with respect to the pre-target interval 
100ms to 0ms. Channels with excessively high variance with respect to neighboring channels and channels 
that saturated during the task were identified by visual inspection of channel variances and interpolated 
(spherical splines). Epoched data were then re-referenced to the average of all channels. Trials on which 
the maximum absolute potential exceeded 60 u mV were rejected from the analysis. The lateralized 
readiness potential (LRP) was measured as the difference in event-related potential (ERP) between 
electrodes at standard 10-20 sites C3 and C4 (Gratton et al., 1988). Specifically, the ERP waveform 
ipsilateral to the correct response-hand was subtracted from the contralateral waveform so that the upward 
positive direction signified motor preparation favoring the correct, sensory cued response alternative. 
Signals were baseline-corrected with respect to a time period just prior to target presentation, when value 
was not yet mapped to actions. The centro-parietal positivity (CPP) was measured directly from electrode 
site CPz (O’Connell et al., 2012), with baseline correction relative to a 100-ms interval at cue onset. Cue-
locked (200 to 500 ms with respect to the color-change of the fixation square) and response-locked (400 
to 50 ms with respect to the button press) ERPs were extracted from these longer single trial epochs, and 
an additional offline low-pass filter up to 10 Hz (4th-order Butterworth) was applied prior to plotting in 
the intervals 0 to 380 ms and 280 to 30 ms, respectively. In order to test for the qualitative predictions of 
the alternative models, we plotted the LRP for four separate behavioral conditions: incorrect responses to 
low-value cues, correct responses to high-value cues and fast and slow correct responses to low-value cues 
(split by median reaction time). High-value error trials were not analyzed further due to low trial numbers 
(43.8 ± 27.1 per subject). 
 
2.2.8 Statistical analyses: 
To test for trends across subjects in the quality of quantitative behavioral fits of the competing models, we 
carried out a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors of bias type (Starting point bias versus 
drift rate bias) and fast-error mechanism (starting point variability versus increasing evidence). Repeated-
measures t tests and one-way ANOVAs were employed as appropriate to test for the presence of starting 
point bias, variability and turn-around effect in the LRP waveforms. Significance was defined as p < 0.05. 
For all error bars and waveform error-bar shading, between-subject variability has been factored out so 
that only variance relevant to a repeated-measures experimental design remains. Note that for the VMSR 
model, error shading is not directly comparable to real LRP waveform error shading as it does not include 
systematic noise that is present in EEG recording. In order to test for the presence of the expected signature 
of the ‘‘turn-around’’ effect on slow, correct, low-value trials, we conducted t tests between the amplitude 
in a time period in which the signature was expected to occur (in line with model simulations) to an 
appropriate preceding time frame within that same single condition. For the LRP, we tested the interval 
170-200 ms against the preceding interval 0-30 ms. Importantly, the expected signature is different for the 
CPP because whereas the LRP reflects a signed, differential index of the decision process, the CPP climbs 
positively for cumulative evidence for either alternative (correct or incorrect), thus instead reflecting the 
absolute value of differential cumulative evidence. This means that whereas initial accumulation of wrong 
evidence is unmistakable in the negative-going deflections in the LRP, in the CPP these register as positive, 






the correct evidence has begun to exceed the wrong evidence, bringing cumulative differential evidence 
back to baseline levels. Though the CPP undergoes this characteristic dip on each single trial, due to its 
narrow extent and temporal jitter this comes out more like a plateau in average decision variable 
simulations of the VMSR model. Thus, in order to test for either a dip or plateau, we tested against the null 
hypothesis that the CPP rises from start to finish monotonically without such a dip or plateau. For each 
subject a straight line was first computed by connecting the onset (taken as 100 ms for all subjects) to the 
individual peak in the stimulus locked CPP and we tested for a difference in amplitude in the interval 240-
270 ms (where the dip/plateau is expected to occur) compared to the interval 170-200 ms (where buildup 





Behavioral data on this rapid value-biased color discrimination task (bimanual color-value, or BCV task) 
(Figure 2.2) revealed that errors were more frequent on low-value cues (erring toward the high-value 
option= 28% versus erring toward low-value option=12%, t(13) = 5.55, p < 10-4) and correct responses to 
low-value cues (mean = 335 ms) were slower than to high-value cues (mean = 280 ms; t(13) = 9.29, p < 10-
6), which is typical in decisions with unequal payoffs (Mulder et al., 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Behavioral Task and Data. (A) Upon achieving fixation, subjects first viewed two peripheral, equiluminant 
green and cyan discs (‘‘targets’’) indicating which color alternative maps to which response hand on the current trial. 
After a 777- to 824-ms delay, the fixation point abruptly changed its color with equal probability to one of the target 
colors, demanding immediate execution of the corresponding response within a strict deadline of 325 ms. Depending 
on the cued color, a correct response earned the subject 5 or 40 points. Here, a low-value correct trial is illustrated. 
Within each 120-trial block, the color-to-value association remained fixed, but the mapping of color to response 
changed pseudorandomly on a trial-by-trial basis. (B) Upper panel: RT distributions for both correct (thick lines) and 
error responses (thin lines) on trials with high-value cues (red) and low-value cues (green). The 325-ms deadline is 
indicated by the vertical gray line. Mean RTs are indicated by symbols placed over the respective RT distributions. 
Error bars indicate SEM, which extends little beyond the symbol sizes. Lower panel: Conditional accuracy functions 
quantifying accuracy as a function of RT. Action choices were strongly value-biased for fast responses but became 
increasingly sensory-based with increasing RT, eventually converging on almost perfect accuracy. 







Figure 2.3: Comparison of Alternative Accumulation-to-Bound Models. (A–D) Schematics illustrating the four 
alternative, simplified models for capturing the value biases and relatively fast error RTs observed in our behavioral 
data. In the standard models typically examined (A and B), sensory evidence (SE) is stationary (additive noise not 
shown), and thus, the DV on average increases linearly with time. In the models with IE (C and D), drift rate 
(represented directly as mean sensory evidence here for clarity of presentation) increases linearly over time so that the 
DV grows with a curved (quadratic) path and has no VS. In the SPB models, the initial DV value is shifted toward the 
high-value bound with no change to the evidence (A and C). In the DRB models, the sensory evidence driving the 
accumulation process is offset in the direction of the higher value (B and D). (E) Mean BIC values quantifying 
goodness of fit for the four alternative models arranged in the same order as (A–D). The smallest BIC values for the 
DRB model with IE signifies that it provides the best fit to behavior. Average parameter values are listed in Table 2.1 
and simulated RT distributions and conditional accuracy functions in Figure 2.7B. Adding either a difference in non-
decision time between high- and low-value responses or drift rate variability to the standard stationary evidence 
models did not change these results (see Figure 2.4). (F–I) Simulated DV dynamics over time starting from the onset 
of accumulation for correct high-value-cued trials, correct low-value-cued trials with relatively fast and relatively slow 
RTs, and incorrect low-value-cued trials, using parameters estimated from the behavioral fit of each competing model 
(E). SPBs were reflected in positive and negative shifts in DV starting level for high- and low-value cues, respectively 
(‘‘1’’; F and H). VS was reflected in error trials being associated with a starting level closer to the error bound and 
higher starting levels for faster correct trials (‘‘2’’; F and G). A biased and increasing drift rate was uniquely associated 
with a turn-around effect on slower, correct responses to low-value cues due to drift rate shifting from an initially 
negative to a positive value due to the growing sensory influence. With stochastic variation, this initial downward 
trajectory often goes far enough to cross the lower bound, resulting in an error. SPB-VS, SPB model with variable 
starting point; DRB-VS, DRB model with variable starting point; SPB-IE, SPB model with increasing evidence; DRB-
IE, DRB model with increasing evidence. 
 
We also saw that error reaction times (RTs) were significantly faster than correct RTs—not only 
for low-value cues (t(13) = 18.14; p < 10-9), but also for high-value cues (t(13) = 4.25; p < 0.001). When 
we plot accuracy over ascending RT, there was a dynamic shift from almost purely value-based choices 
(choices towards high value option) to fully sensory-based, correct responses (Figure 2.2B lower panel). 
Fast errors are generally accounted for by adding random trial-to-trial variability in starting point (Ratcliff 
and McKoon, 2008), however another explanation is that sensory evidence strength (hence drift rate 
(Shadlen et al., 2007)) increases over time while being accumulated. The latter is plausible since it has been 
shown that even for physically strong, abruptly onsetting sensory events, feature-selective sensory neural 
representations do not emerge in a discrete instant but rather emerge gradually (Siegel et al., 2015; Chen et 
al., 2007) when viewed on the narrow timescale of rapid decisions. So we generated models with either 






SPB and DRB models. We fit the two simple models and these 4 new models to individual subject RT 
distributions. 
 
Table 2.1. BCV task, average parameter estimates and goodness of fit measures for 4 models. Average parameter 
estimates for the starting point bias with starting point variability (SPB-VS), drift rate bias with starting point 
variability (DRB-VS), starting point bias with increasing evidence (SPB-IE) and drift rate bias with increasing 
evidence (DRB-IE) models. Average G-squared and BIC values for the individual model fits are also given, where 






Figure 2.4: Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) values for each individual subject. (A) Bayes Information Criterion 
(BIC) for each individual subject quantifying goodness of fit across the four alternative, reduced-parameter models of 
Figure 2, alongside a pair of additional, basic models that serve as a further benchmark. Models are grouped into three 
pairs, in each of which the value bias was applied to either the starting point or drift rate: stationary-evidence models 
with no starting point variability (SPB & DRB; 4 free parameters: non-decision time tnd, bound b, drift rate d, and 
either starting point bias zB or drift rate bias dB), stationary-evidence models with starting point variability (SPB-VS 
& DRB-VS; 5 free parameters including those of the SPB/DRB models plus starting point variability sz), and 
increasing evidence models without starting point variability (SPB-IE & DRB-IE; 4 free parameters: nondecision time 






the models are listed along the bottom, with schematics of each model’s average decision variable trajectory provided 
above, as a further key. Smaller BIC values signify a better fit. Different subjects are plotted in different colors. As 
expected from many previous studies (Dunovan et al., 2014; Voss et al., 2004), the fit was better among the stationary-
evidence models with starting-point bias than with drift rate bias, and better with than without starting-point 
variability. However, models with increasing evidence outperformed all of those standard models, and among them, 
a drift rate bias provided the better account of value-biases in behavior. It is noteworthy that not every individual 
subject exhibited a drift rate bias that dominated over starting point bias, motivating future research to examine inter-
individual differences in a wider population. (B) BIC values for alternative standard models with added nondecision 
time differences or drift rate variability. We ran four alternative models that like the standard models of Figure 2 
include starting point variability and a bias for either starting point or drift rate alone, and also include alternative 
mechanisms for explaining the value bias in behavior and/or the turn-around effect in decision variable dynamics. 
Specifically, the striking separation of RT distributions for correct responses to high-value versus low-value cues 
suggest the possibility that subjects may be faster at executing the motor responses associated with higher value. The 
“dTr” models thus implement a relative delay in non-decision time for low-value responses relative to high value ones. 
A second potentially relevant mechanism is random trial-to-trial drift rate variability. Although this is normally 
included in drift diffusion models to account for relatively slow erroneous responses which we do not observe, we 
included this variability parameter in the “VD” models because it may allow for negative drift rates on some trials, 
and hence potentially capture the initial launch of the decision variable towards the incorrect response, which forms 
part of the “turnaround” effect (Figure 2.3I). We fit these models to behavior using exactly the same procedure as the 
other models (See Methods 2.2.5), and here plot the resultant BIC values alongside those of the Increasing-Evidence 
(IE) models for comparison. Subjects are ordered according to the BIC value of the best fitting model (DRB-IE). The 
Increasing-Evidence models still clearly provide a superior account of the behavioral data. 
 
Models with IE produced better fits (lower Bayes information criterion [BIC]) than models with 
VS (main effect of fast-error mechanism: F(1,13) = 30.2, p < 10-3; Figure 2.3E). Further, we found an 
interaction (F(1,13) = 19.5, p < 0.01) whereby an SPB provided a better fit for stationary-evidence models 
with VS as is typically observed (t(13) = 4.26, p < 0.001), but a DRB provided the better fit among models 
with IE (t(13) = 2.42, p < 0.05). These alternative models predict qualitatively distinct initial DV dynamics 
when comparing across value conditions (high- versus low-value cues) and behavioral outcomes (low-value 
cued trials with relatively fast correct versus slow correct versus error responses; Figures 2.3F–I). By 
simulating average DV trajectories from the time point of accumulation onset using parameters from the 
behavioral fits, we observed that while bias (labeled ‘‘1’’) and/or variability (‘‘2’’) in the start point were 
expressed in the expected differences in the starting level, a dynamic ‘‘turn-around’’ effect was uniquely 
exhibited in the DRB-IE model (‘‘3’’). For low-value cues in this model, drift rate starts out negative and 
systematically shifts to positive values over time (Figure 2.3D). With trial-to-trial variability due to noise, 
the DV often crosses the incorrect bound before being re-routed by the growing sensory influence, but on 
trials where it comes close but is ‘‘rescued’’ just in time, there is a distinct turn around in its trajectory, 








Figure 2.5: Electrophysiological Signals Reflecting Relative Motor Preparation and Evidence Accumulation. 
(A) Empirically measured differential motor preparation reflected in the LRP for the same four trial conditions as 
simulated in Figures 2.3F–I. Upward deflections reflect preparation toward the correct response. Key signatures of all 
four simplified models (Figure 2.3) are exhibited. Right: scalp potential distribution of the difference between left-
response and right-response trials, illustrating the LRP topography. (B) The CPP, which reflects a motor-independent 
representation of cumulative evidence at a more abstract level, plotted for the same conditions. Consistent with initial 
accumulation of ‘‘wrong’’ evidence followed by a gradual takeover of correct evidence (reflected in the turn around 
in LRP), the CPP exhibited an initial buildup, then a momentary lull (roughly coincident with LRP crossing back over 
its baseline level), and then resumed buildup particularly for the conditions of incorrect and slow correct low-value 
cues. In the case of errors, the initial buildup of wrong evidence was enough to cross the error bound. Note that the 
fact that the dip is most strongly exhibited for slower correct and fast incorrect low-value cued trials—the two 
conditions with longest and shortest RTs, respectively—rules out the possibility that these patterns arise from 
differences in the temporal overlap of non-decision related stimulus- and response-locked processes due to RT 
differences. Figure 2.8A repeats this analysis for more RT bins to highlight graded nature of effects. 
 
To empirically test for these value-biasing signatures, we traced the trajectories of two 
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals known to reflect evidence accumulation dynamics. We first 
examined the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), which continuously traces the relative degree of motor 
preparation for the correct (positive values in Figure 2.5A) versus incorrect (negative values) action as the 
decision unfolds and thereby reflects differential DV dynamics (Gratton et al., 1988). Signatures of all 
models were exhibited to varying degrees in the LRP waveforms (Figure 2.5A). Most strikingly, a clear 
turn-around effect was observed for slow, correct low-value-cued trials (time interval 170–200 ms 
compared to 0–30 ms; t(13) = 5.79, p < 10-4) as uniquely predicted by the biased, dynamic drift-rate (DRB-
IE) model. Starting levels around cue onset (-50 to 50 ms) also reflected an SPB (high- versus low-value 
cues: t(13) = 2.70, p < 0.02) and VS (one-way ANOVA for low-value fast, slow, error: F(2,26) = 4.56, p = 
0.02). While these starting-level effects were smaller in magnitude than those predicted by the models 
allowing for them (Figure2.3 F–H), the turn-around effect was more pronounced in the LRP waveforms 
(Figure 2.5A) than predicted by the DRB-IE model simulation (Figure2.3 I). 
 
We next examined the centro-parietal positivity (CPP), which has been shown to reflect 
accumulation-to-bound dynamics independent of sensory modality or response requirements, consistent 
with an abstract DV computed upstream of effector-specific motor-preparation circuits (O’Connell et al., 
2012). CPP is suggested to reflect the absolute value of cumulative, differential evidence (Kelly and 
O’Connell, 2015). It would follow that on slow, correct low-value-cued trials exhibiting a strong turn-
around effect, the CPP should first rise with the initial accumulation of ‘‘wrong’’ evidence, drop or plateau 






with the accumulation of further correct evidence. The CPP exhibited this very pattern (Figure 2.5B; t(13) 
= 4.92, p = 0.0003, difference in amplitude between 240–270 ms and 170–200 ms greater than that expected 
for monotonic buildup). Thus, the turn-around effect is not specific to or introduced at the level of motor 
preparation and is manifested in upstream, motor-independent processing levels, consistent with 
modulations of the accumulator input. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Value-Modulated Sensory Response Model. (A) Idealized sensory responses of two neural populations 
with a tuning preference for each color alternative, forming the basis of the VMSR model. Response profiles trace the 
expectation (i.e., trial average) of activity over time and additive noise is applied on each single trial. Taking the 
example of a presented cyan cue, the ‘‘preferred’’ (cyan neurons) and ‘‘unpreferred’’ (green neurons) sensory 
populations are initially excited equally strongly under value neutral conditions (left) but selectivity gradually develop 
as the unpreferred population activity drops away. The differential evidence (gray trace) thus increases from zero to a 
stable positive level. When cyan is the higher-value color (middle), the cyan neurons’ response is enhanced and the 
green neurons’ response attenuated, which results in a positive offset in the differential evidence (red trace). 
Meanwhile, when cyan is the lower-value color (right), the modulations are reversed so that the differential evidence 
is offset negatively (green trace) as in the abstract version of the model (Figure 2.3D). (B) Simulation of average DV 
trajectories for the VMSR model using parameters from fits to the behavioral data. Both cue-locked and response-
locked DV waveforms, simulated for each individual and then averaged, match the empirically observed dynamics of 
the LRP (Figure 2.5A), including the distinctive turn-around effect. (C) The motor-independent accumulator signal 
(CPP) was simulated from the same behavioral fit of the VMSR model by taking the absolute value of the cumulative 
differential sensory evidence (|ΣSE|) on each single trial. Like the empirical CPP (Figure 2.5B), the simulated CPP 
trace for incorrect and slow correct low-value cues undergoes an initial buildup followed by a lull and then a second 
phase of buildup. Note that although the simulated CPP traces on single trials with turn-around effects dip down to 
zero at the time point where differential cumulative evidence passes from negative to positive, averaging across trials 







The essential ingredient of the best-fitting DRB-IE model is a temporally increasing drift rate that 
is offset toward the higher-value option (Figure 2.3D), with the drift rate of the two value conditions 
implemented as simple linear affine functions. In practice, however, neural feature selectivity does not 
continue to grow to infinity, and how drift rate can initialize with a negative value for low-value cues is not 
immediately obvious. We thus developed an explanatory account in terms of idealized but plausible, 
aggregate responses for two sensory neuronal populations, each with a tuning preference for one of the two 
color alternatives (Figure 2.6A). Mimicking motion-direction-selective neurons of the monkey middle 
temporal area (Gold and Shadlen, 2007), both populations initially respond nonselectively under neutral 
conditions but thereafter gradually become fully feature-selective (Figure 2.6A [left]). If a value bias is 
exerted by amplifying the responses of the higher-value color-coding population and/or attenuating the low-
value population, then for low-value cues, the differential sensory evidence (‘‘correct’’ minus ‘‘incorrect’’ 
population) assumed to feed the accumulator process would start out negative but immediately grow toward 
a positive value (Figure 2.6A [right]), producing the characteristic turn-around effect in the accumulator. 
We constructed a ‘‘value-modulated sensory response’’ (VMSR) model by parameterizing value-based 
modulation of these sensory responses and adding SPB and variability to allow for the observed effects on 
LRP starting level. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Comparison of real and simulated RT distributions for all models.  
(A) Empirically observed reaction time (RT) distributions (thick and thin solid lines for correct and error responses) 






four reduced-parameter models fit to the behavioral data, we plotted the simulated RT distributions for correct and 
incorrect high and low value cues and hence the conditional accuracy functions. Empirical behavioral data are plotted 
as circles and dots for correct and error trials, respectively. Among the standard, stationary-drift models, the starting 
point bias (SPB-VS) model provides a superior account to the drift rate bias model (DRB-VS), consistent with the 
dominant account. This prevailing model dominance is partly due to the fact that a starting point bias predicts faster 
error RTs for low-value than high-value cues whereas a drift rate bias predicts the opposite. Consistent with the former, 
and like most studies, we found that incorrect responses were made significantly faster on low value cues than on 
high-value cues (t(13)= 3.52, p=0.004), although in the present case this mean difference was small (259 ms vs 248 
ms). The conditional accuracy functions further show that the SPBVS model, but not the DRB-VS model, is capable 
of reproducing the dynamic shift from mainly value-based to mainly sensory-based choices over increasing RT. 
However, when the mean evidence (and hence drift rate) is allowed to increase over time, this shift in influence on 
choice can be captured with both bias types (SPB-IE and DRB-IE), and accuracy converges close to ceiling for both 
value conditions as exhibited in the empirical data, which neither the SPB-VS nor the DRB-VS model can capture 
precisely. Thus, in the standard models accuracy is overestimated for short RT trials and underestimated for long RT 
trials. Further, the DRB-IE model fits significantly better than the SPB-IE model, suggesting that modulations at the 
sensory input level represent a more essential value-biasing mechanism than a starting point shift in our task (see main 
text). (C) Simulation of RT distributions and conditional accuracy functions for the Value-Modulated Sensory 
Response (VMSR) model (top) and Standard Dual-bias model (bottom). The VMSR model provides the closest fit to 








Figure 2.8: Comparison of the Value-Modulated Sensory Response (VMSR) model and Standard Dual- Bias model 
in terms of fits to behavior and to empirical decision signals. (A) Empirical differential motor preparation (LRP) 
waveforms aligned to both cue onset (left) and response (right). Trials with correct responses to low-value cues are 
separated into four RT bins to explicitly show the graded effect whereby the slower the RT, the greater the initial 
traversal towards the incorrect bound before being re-routed towards the correct bound. (B) Timecourse of empirically 
measured centro-parietal positivity (“CPP”). With increasing RT bin for correct low-value cues, the CPP undergoes a 
greater plateau or dip around the time that the LRP reverses direction, and thus has a more delayed resumption of 
buildup. (C) Decision Variable simulation of VMSR model using average parameters from the fits to behavioral data 
(non-decision time tnd = 0.18 sec, bound b = 0.0438, Response magnitude Rm = 1.99, Weibull parameters tau = 0.179 
and k = 3.22, modulatory bias MB = 0.0617, and starting point bias zB = 0.00255, and variability sz = 0.0104). The 
simulated waveforms capture the graded effect across correct RT bins for low-value cues seen in the recorded LRPs. 
As in Figure 2.6B, each subject’s post-decision portion of non-decision time was estimated directly from the peak 
latency of their response-aligned LRP with the remaining amount apportioned to the pre-decision period, and the 
simulated LRP trace fell linearly back to zero over a 60- ms interval upon crossing the threshold. (D) Consistent with 
the most parsimonious account of its generating mechanisms, CPP is simulated as the absolute value of the cumulative 
differential sensory evidence in the VMSR model, using the same model parameters from the behavioral data fits. 
Whereas the simulated LRP was made to fall back to zero upon crossing threshold, we allowed the CPP to continue 
accumulating the ongoing sensory evidence representation. This is based on the assumption that under such strict time 
constraints, responses are generally executed prematurely with respect to the course of a decision process for such 
easy discriminations, and despite having responded the subjects are likely to continue accumulating to attain more 
confident evaluations of the stimulus (Murphy et al., 2015). Like the real one, the simulated CPP captures the graded 
effect whereby increasing RT for correctly responded low-value cues is associated with a greater pause in buildup due 
to the dip/plateau resulting from the turn-around from an incorrect to a correct cumulative evidence total. It is 
noteworthy that the empirically observed turn-around effects are stronger than predicted by the VMSR model. This 
may be because in reality there is a discrete burst of nonselective activity that precedes a second round of activity with 
growing selectivity. Albeit a different sensory feature, such a pattern is exhibited, for example in the responses of 
neurons in monkey area MT to motion in their preferred versus opposite directions (Gold and Shadlen, 2007, data 
from Britten et al., 1992). (E) Decision Variable simulation of Standard Dual-bias model using average parameters 
from the fits to behavioral data (non-decision times tndH = 0.220 sec and tndL = 0.244, bound b = 0.0376, mean drift 
rate d = 0.433, drift rate bias dB = 0.0916, drift rate variability sd = 0.133 and starting point bias zB = 0.00447, and 
variability sz = 0.0334). No initial deflection towards the incorrect bound is seen for any correct low value cue 
conditions. (F) Simulation of CPP signal from the same fit. Neither a dip nor plateau is strongly apparent. (G) BIC 
values quantifying goodness of fit for the VMSR versus Standard Dual-bias model. (H) Single-trial examples of 
simulated trajectories of the differential decision variable (reflected empirically in the LRP) within the condition of 
relatively slow, correct low-value trials. Though noise in the process causes variation in the timing and extent of the 
turn-around effect across trials, the deflection in the ‘wrong’ direction is sufficiently broad and consistent to come 
through in an average. (I) Simulation of the CPP (absolute value of differential cumulative evidence) for the same 
trials. For noisy deflections in either the correct or wrong direction in the signed decision variable (simulated LRP), 
the CPP goes positive, and thus the characteristic signature of the turn-around effect is a dip down to zero on each 
single trial, at the time when the LRP is passing back through its baseline value. However, this is a narrower event 
and due to temporal jitter across trials is less likely to resolve as a dip but rather more as a plateau in averaged 
waveforms. 
 
For comparison, we constructed a strong ‘‘standard’’ model with stationary evidence that also had 
both bias types based on recent findings that models allowing for DRBs in addition to the dominant SPBs 
capture prior-biased decision behavior better than models with only an SPB. We also allowed for the fact 
that non-decision delays may be shorter for executing high-value motor responses than for executing low-
value motor responses and included trial-to-trial drift rate variability because it could potentially produce 
negative drift rates on some low-value trials and hence, an initial launch in the incorrect direction as 
observed in the data. The VMSR model provided a significantly better behavioral fit than the standard dual-
bias model (t(13) = 5.04, p = 0.0002; Figure 2.8G). We again simulated average DV waveforms, this time 
both stimulus- and response-aligned and with the CPP simulated as the absolute value of cumulative 
evidence. This revealed a strong similarity between the real and VMSR-simulated waveforms (Figure 9A 






strong turn-around effect in both the LRP and CPP. In contrast, the standard dual-bias model overestimated 
the starting-level effects and did not produce turn-around dynamics. Accordingly, correlations between real 
and simulated waveforms were significantly greater for the VMSR model (LRP: t(13) = 3.28, p = 0.006; 
CPP: t(13) = 2.48, p = 0.028). 
 
Taking the above results together, we confirmed the hypothesis for Chapter 2 both with behavioral 
model fitting and electrophysiological tracing of decision process where a drift rate bias with increasing 
evidence model gave the best fit to the behavioral data and particular predictions made by this model are 
observed in the electrophysiological traces of decision formation, suggesting a drift rate bias, potentially 
through a sensory level modulation, is a more essential mechanism than a starting point shift in our task.  
Given the novelty of the finding that drift rate biases appeared to dominate over starting point biases 
in this task, it was of interest to test the generality of this finding to other response modalities, sensory 
features and reward valence. To this end, we thus compared the simple models (SPB-VS, DRB-IE, etc) on 
versions of this task with saccades used as response effectors instead of button clicks, with shapes to be 
discriminated instead of colors, and with colors associated with reward losses rather than gains, and 
confirmed that the DRB-IE model provided the best quantitative fit of the behavior in all cases 




Even for perceptually obvious events, selecting and executing the response that maximizes the 
likely payoff is a significant challenge when time is limited, yet this common scenario has received little 
attention in decision neuroscience. Here, we showed that the mechanisms underlying such behavior 
significantly depart from standard models of simple perceptual judgments. 
In keeping with all previous studies of biased decisions, standard, stationary-evidence model fits 
suggested that SPBs were strongly dominant over DRBs in accounting for behavior. However, simply by 
incorporating a temporal increase in evidence strength mimicking real sensory neural response dynamics 
over such short time frames, fits were not only generally superior, but this dominance in biasing 
mechanisms was reversed. Further, we showed that compared to a model implementing both SPBs and 
DRBs in the standard way (Dunovan et al., 2014; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012; Moran, 2015), a model that 
implements the biased, increasing drift rate effect through plausible sensory response modulations 
alongside SPBs provides a significantly better account of both behavior and the temporal dynamics of 
neurophysiological decision signals at two sensorimotor processing levels across the entire time frame of 
the decision. This not only provides novel insights into decision mechanisms in time-constrained scenarios, 
but also more broadly underscores the fact that the role of certain mechanisms in any decision model can 
be misinterpreted when other core aspects of the brain’s decision processes are mischaracterized. The 
crucial signature of our model was a turn-around effect on low-value cues, whereby the differential evidence 
accumulator is initially launched toward the higher-value action but then dynamically re-routed toward the 
correct action. Our observation of this effect in the dynamics of relative motor preparation is unprecedented 
for a decision of this nature. Dynamic shifts in dominance of two competing alternative motor plans have 
been observed in situations where multiple, conflicting sensory stimuli are presented, either together (e.g., 
in the Flanker task (Gratton et al., 1988) or value-based choice tasks (Sullivan et al., 2015)) or sequentially 
(e.g., the ‘‘compelled response task’’ (Stanford et al., 2010), but here, we observe the effect for a single, 
discrete sensory feature change due to the purely internal conflict between value and sensory information. 
Further, that the effect was observed for correct low-value trials considered alone (not averaged with errors 
(Noorbaloochi et al., 2015)) demonstrates its role in ‘‘rescuing’’ the decision from value biased errors 
almost committed. These turn-around dynamics have the appearance of ‘‘changes of mind’’ reported to 






they are driven systematically by the gradual shift of balance from value-driven to sensory-driven 
accumulation. 
Our observation of the turn-around perturbation in abstract level evidence accumulation reflected 
in the CPP supports the idea that value directly influences the input of the accumulation process. This could 
occur through modulation of the sensory representations themselves, similar to neuronal response 
modulations observed due to feature-based attention (Motter, 1994; Reynolds et al., 2000; Treue and 
Martinez, 1999; Treue and Maunsell, 1996; Moran and Desimone, 1985) and expectation (Kok, 2013) and 
consistent with reward sensitivity reported for early visual activity (Stanisor et al., 2013; Serences, 2008). 
Alternatively, value may produce DRBs by shifting the weighting or reference values used in the readout 
of sensory representations fed into the accumulator without altering the sensory representations directly. 
The computational implementation of our models is compatible with either alternative, and thus, future 
work must employ direct measures of early sensory responses to resolve this. Future work must also address 
how subjects learn to employ one or the other bias type depending on the temporal, sensory, and value 
settings of a given situation. Other novel models have previously produced fits to value biased behavior 
superior to the standard SPB or DRB models (Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006; Noorbaloochi et al., 2015), 
but in contrast to our account, they assume non-overlapping influences of value and sensory information 
on the decision process. The ‘‘two-stage-processing’’ hypothesis (Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006) is based 
on the idea of a discrete attention switch from value to sensory information. Though conceptually distinct, 
this bears a practical similarity to our model in that the DV is first driven by value and then sensory 
information, and our VMSR model effectively offers a plausible implementation of a more graded version 
of this shift. In another model, a value-biased, short-latency ‘‘fast-guess’’ process sometimes enters the 
race between two sensory accumulators (Noorbaloochi et al., 2015). Although originally conceived to 
account for accuracy costs due to speed pressure (Ollman, 1996; Yellott, 1971), more recent research tends 
to categorize fast guesses as ‘‘contaminant’’ events (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). Our VMSR model 
provides a plausible mechanism for generating fast-guess behaviors without recourse to the idea of a 
separate, non-integrative (Simen et al., 2009) fast-guess process in the brain. It further can specify, through 
an extremely simple mapping, how the computational process of decision formation translates to the 
observed dynamics of evidence accumulation and motor preparation measured electrophysiologically. 
Time-dependent biases in decision-signal buildup have been reported for decisions benefiting from prior 
information in tasks where stimulus strength varies randomly across trials (Hanks et al., 2011), a scenario 
in which this biasing mechanism is optimal (Moran, 2015). These bias components are conceived as buildup 
components added to cumulative evidence rather than alterations directly to drift rate or the sensory inputs 
being integrated and lead to an increasing expression of bias with increasing RT in mixed difficulty 
conditions as opposed to a decreasing influence as observed here. Dynamic shifts in drift rate in the course 
of a single decision have previously been employed to model behavior when the physical stimulus itself 
changes by disappearing, being backward-masked (Smith et al., 2004; Ratcliff and Rouder, 2000), or 
switching mid-trial (Cisek et al., 2009; Thura and Cisek, 2014; Thura et al., 2012; Holmes et al., 2016) 
during shifts of attention among display items (White et al., 2011; Purcell et al., 2010; Teichert et al., 2014) 
or visual memory trace formation (Smith and Ratcliff, 2009). Our findings highlight the potential 
importance of time-dependent drift rate for even unitary, simple discrimination decisions, and that although 
the stationary evidence assumption provides good quantitative behavioral fits for temporally extended 
judgments (Ratcliff et al., 2016; Ratcliff, 2002), it may overlook a critical dynamic feature in rapid, time 









Chapter 3  HOW DOES THE NATURE AND TIMESCALE OF VALUE ASSOCIATION 
INFLUENCE VALUE-BIASING STRATEGY?  
 
In Chapter 2 we observed convergent evidence from behavioral modeling and electrophysiology 
for a biasing of drift rate underlying value-prioritized sensorimotor decisions. The drift rate bias actually 
appeared even to dominate over starting point shifts. Since this strongly diverges from prevailing accounts 
in the literature, we followed to ask, to what degree are these findings unique to the particular task demands 
under which our subjects performed the task. In particular, in the original BCV task, color-value 
associations were instructed to the participants at the beginning of each block, giving rise to a long-term 
color-value mapping, which might have facilitated a drift rate modulation specific to this task. For example, 
a long-term association of green with high value may boost the sensory representation of green (Anderson 
et al., 2011), leading to drift rate biases, which may not otherwise be invoked in the absence of such a long-
term association. In this chapter we investigate the critical factor of how the value associations are formed 
by manipulating the time-frame of color-value mapping. We decided to test if drift rate bias would still be 
observed under the conditions where motor-side is associated with value over the entire block of trials (e.g. 
right side is 40pts when cued, left side is 5 pts), whereas color-value mapping changes randomly from trial 
to trial depending on the randomized target locations. We label this the Bimanual Action-Value (BAV) 
paradigm to distinguish from the original Bimanual Color-Value (BCV) task of Chapter 2. 
 
How might action-value priming bias the behavior and decision process? As we instruct subjects 
about the unequal rewards associated with different motor sides rather than different colors for a given 
block, we could expect to observe behavioral and electrophysiological signatures of strong motor level 
biasing and very little or no sensory level biasing. Biases in motor readiness are known to be reflected in 
biased starting levels of motor preparation signals (Noorbaloochi et al., 2015), and may thus lead to a 
dominant starting-point bias in a bounded accumulation model. However, it is possible that participants are 
able to rapidly form color-value associations in the short time frame of each trial (trial by trial color-value 
association is randomized) and the electrophysiological and behavioral signatures of sensory-level biasing 
may be observed, as in our first experiment. In this case, value-modulation of sensory responses may be a 
general mechanism that applies in any severely time-restricted sensorimotor task regardless of time-scale 
of value association.  
 
In this experiment we focus on comparing starting point bias models to drift rate bias models in a 
similar manner to the section comparing simpler abstract models in the first study.  Motor level readiness 
is measured by LRP baseline activity and, in this case, also spectral amplitude in the mu/beta band. Also 
models with starting point variability and models with increasing evidence along with starting point bias or 
drift rate bias will be compared to see the contextual specificity of value modulated sensory biasing, and 
whether gradual formation of sensory evidence representation (temporally increasing evidence 
representation) that is evidenced in the BCV study is a general phenomenon in deliberative, perceptual 














In order to test the contextual specificity of the bias effect and the implicated mechanisms that are 
suggested in the previous chapter, human participants performed rapid, supra-threshold color 
discrimination task, reported through left/right hand button clicks within a very strict deadline, however 
this time, with one alternative side rewarded more points than the other, if it is cued and correctly 
responded within time limit. While subjects were informed about the value-color associations before the 
blocks in the original task, in this version they were informed of the value-response hand associations before 
the blocks, and value-color mapping changed randomly from trial to trial (Figure 3.1). This modification 
essentially corresponds to a long-term association of the response hand with reward magnitude and permits 
only a short-term association of the color with reward magnitude.  
 
Figure 3.1: Value-action association version of rapid value biased color discrimination task. (BAV – Bimanual Action-
Value task) 
 
16 participants (ranging in age from 22 to 35 years old (mean=26 years), 9 female) were recruited 
for the study of Chapter 3 (11 of them were naive to the lab and completed BCV task after BAV, while 
other 5 were the returning subjects from BCV task). $12 per hour compensation was given to the subjects 
and they could earn up to $12 additionally depending on the points they earned (1 pts = $0.0044). The 
experiments took place in a dark, sound-attenuated booth. Participants were seated 57 cm from a CRT 
monitor with a refresh rate of 85 Hz and resolution of 600 x 800. Participants were instructed to maintain 
fixation on a small square (0.5o of visual angle) in the center of the screen for the duration of each trial, and 
eye position was monitored with a remote eye tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research, 1000Hz) same with 
the previous experiment.  
For this study, they were instructed about the action-value association in the beginning of each 
block (right side = 40 points, left side = 5 points or right side =5 points, left side= 40 points). Action-to-
value mapping remained constant within each block of 120 trials and was switched after three blocks with 
the initial mapping counterbalanced across subjects. To obtain a reward, subjects had to press a button with 
the index finger of the hand corresponding to the location of the cued target color within a strict deadline 
of 325 ms. Other details of the task and stimuli were kept the same as the original task. Our modelling and 
simulation and electrophysiological analysis methods were the same as in the previous experiment, except 








Plotting of the behavioral data (Fig 3.2), showed that the main indicators of a biased decision are 
present. Error rate for high value trials were less than error rate for low value trials (t(15) = 5.37, p = 
7.85x10-5; p < 0.001). Subjects erred towards the high value side more often, showing the successful 
implementation of biased choice behavior due to verbal instruction of valuable side.  
 
Figure 3.2: Reaction time distribution and conditional accuracy function for the BAV task (n=16). HiVal: high value 
trials where the 40pts side is cued, LoVal: low value trials where the 5 pts side is cued, Correct: correctly responded 
trials, Error: incorrectly responded trials. Vertical line denotes the response deadline (325ms). 
 
For this part of the study, 11 naïve subjects and 5 subjects who had previously taken part in the BCV task 
of Chapter 2, were recruited. When we investigated the behavioral data of these two groups separately, we 
observed a striking hysteresis effect, where the degree of value bias in behavior depended on which of the 
two tasks the subjects first performed. Subjects who did the BCV task previously showed a similarly 
moderate behavioral bias when they performed the BAV task, in terms of error rate difference between high 
and low-value trial types (Fig 3.3 – dashed orange). Meanwhile, subjects who did the BAV task first were 
far more biased (Fig 3.3 – solid orange), and interestingly, continued to be strongly biased when they later 
performed the BCV task (Fig 3.3 dashed blue), even showing a gradually increasing error rate difference 








Figure 3.3: A) Error rate difference between high value and low value trials plotted throughout the 6 experimental 
blocks for both BCV and BAV tasks for each group of subjects (naïve/experienced). Solid blue: BCV task (naive 
subjects, n=14), Dashed blue: BCV task (BAV-experienced subjects, n=9), Solid orange:  BAV task (naïve subjects, 
n=11), Dashed orange: BAV task (BCV- experienced subjects, n=5). 
 
When we compared the reaction time distributions of naïve (Figure 3.4a) and non-naïve (BCV-experienced; 
Figure 3.4b) subjects for the BAV task, we observed very fast responses towards the high value side 
particular to naïve BAV subjects (highlighted with a square figure 3.4a), explaining the large difference in 
overall error rate differences above. In light of these qualitative differences in behavior depending on which 
task the subjects performed first, we decided to restrict further analysis to the larger subgroup of 11 naïve 
subjects who performed the BAV task first for the sake of homogeneity of strategy in the sample. We note, 
however, that the effects of task history on the behavioral patterns and underlying bias mechanisms will be 








Figure 3.4: BAV task data. Reaction time distributions (RT) and conditional accuracy functions (CAF) of a) naïve 
subjects, b) BCV-experienced subjects. The deadline is marked by the vertical black line. Mean +/- SD RTs are shown 
above the distributions. 
 
For the 11 naïve subjects, errors were more frequent on low-value cues (i.e., erring toward the high-value 
option; 56% versus 14%, t(10) = 5.1822, p = 4.11x10-4), and correct responses to low-value cues (mean = 
285 ms) were slower than to high-value cues (mean = 242 ms; t(10) = 5.78, p=1.77x10-4). Error reaction 
times (RTs) were significantly faster than correct RTs—for low-value cues (t(10) =6.53; p = 6.64x10-5), 
but not for high-value cues  (t(10) =1.10; p = 0.30). Plotting accuracy over ascending RT revealed a dynamic 
shift from almost purely value-based choices to fully sensory-based, correct responses. While these findings 
are similar to those from the BCV task, the extremely fast value-biased responses in the behavior on the 
BAV task, again, represents a striking difference compared to the BCV data (see Figure 2.2) 
 
As our main aim here was to test the specificity/ generalizability of the dominance of drift rate biases over 
starting-point biases found in the study of chapter 2, we compared the six basic models formed by having 
either a starting-point bias or a drift rate bias, and having no mechanism for fast errors (SPB and DRB 










Figure 3.5: Goodness of fit (BIC) values of basic six models for BAV task. SPB = starting point bias. DRB = drift rate 
bias. SPB-VS = starting point bias with variability in starting point. DRB-VS = drift rate bias with variability in 
starting point. SPB-IE = starting point bias with increasing evidence. DRB-IE = drift rate bias with increasing 
evidence. Error bars indicate standard errors after factoring out the between-subject variability. 
 
 
Fitting these basic models showed that when bias mechanisms are compared, DRB models consistently fit 
the empirical response time data better than their SPB counterparts, even in the case of stationary evidence 
models, reflected in lower BIC values. Addition of increasing evidence mechanism to standard models 
significantly enhanced their fit to empirical data. As the DRB-IE model gave the lowest BIC value among 
all, it appears that a drift rate modulation with non-stationary evidence is again implicated in the decision 
making process in this short-term value-color mapping variant of the original task. However, the BIC values 
for this best model were nevertheless far higher than those for the same model in the first experiment (by 
>150 on average), reflecting a poor fit most likely due to the extremely fast, purely value-based responses 
unique to the BAV task. It was crucial, therefore, to develop these basic models further to achieve a more 













Table 3.1: BAV task, average parameter estimates and goodness of fit measures for basic models. 
 
A straightforward way to explain these fast responses (Figure 3.4a, highlighted with a square in figure) is 
through the idea that, under such severely time-constrained conditions, the accumulating decision process 
may begin even before the sensory response starts. The idea of “premature” (pre-evidence) accumulation 
has recently been established in the context of tasks in which the transition of a pre-existing stimulus to 
presenting discriminatory sensory evidence is subtle, through being weak and uncertainly timed (Devine et 
al., 2019) or being embedded in motion noise (Kelly et al., 2019). In the current task, although the transitions 
to evidence are via a sudden stimulus onset and assuredly not subtle, the response deadline is very short, 
and so it is possible that the accumulation process is started in advance of the first samples of color-
discriminating evidence. In order to implement this idea we incorporated an accumulation onset time 
(“aot”) parameter in our models (Eqs 3.1). This was implemented as an additional time parameter 
quantifying the amount of time preceding the evidence onset time (where average, unbiased drift rate begins 
to be non-zero) at which accumulation begins. During this period of advance accumulation, pure noise is 
accumulated on top of the starting point bias in SPB models, whereas in the DRB models, the accumulated 
noise is biased by the amount defined by the drift rate bias parameter (Figure 3.7). In other words, we 
assume that the drift rate bias is applied across all time, not just after the color-discriminating evidence 

















Equations 3.1: In the below we specify the difference equations defining the dynamics of each model, for the high and 
low-value trials separately. Similar to chapter 2, zB refers to starting point bias, sz (starting point variability), tnd (non-
decision time), d (drift rate), s (gaussian noise), aot (pre-evidence, accumulation period), dB (bias in drift rate), c (rate 
of evidence increase). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
SPB-VS-aot 
x(0)= zB + rand1*sz                                                                   t < (tnd-aot)   (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                        (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + d*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                    tnd < t  
 
x(0)= - zB + rand1*sz                                                                   t < (tnd-aot)   (Low-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                        (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + d*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                    tnd < t  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
DRB-VS-aot 
x(0)= 0 + rand1*sz                                                                     t < (tnd-aot)   (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) +  dB *dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))             (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (d + dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                   tnd < t  
 
x(0)= 0 + rand1*sz                                                                     t < (tnd-aot)   (Low-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (- dB ) *dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))              (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (d - dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                       tnd < t  
_____________________________________________________________________________________  
SPB-IE-aot 
x(0)= zB                                                                                       t < (tnd-aot)   (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                        (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + c*t*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                 tnd < t  
 
x(0)= - zB                                                                                     t < (tnd-aot)   (Low-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                        (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + c*t*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))                                 tnd < t  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
DRB-IE-aot 
x(0)= 0 ;                 t < (tnd-aot)   (High-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ,            (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (dB + c*t)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt))         tnd < t  
 
x(0)= 0 ;                 t < (tnd-aot)   (Low-value cue) 
x(t) =  x(t-1) + (- dB)*dt + N(0, s*sqrt(dt)) ,            (tnd-aot) < t < tnd 










          
Figure 3.7 - Illustration of  drift diffusion models with accumulation onset time. In the SPB models, accumulation of 
noise during the aot period tends to be flat on average because it has a mean of zero, before the evidence drives the 
decision variable upwards at t=Ter. In the DRB models, the drift rate bias is assumed to take effect even in the baseline 
activity of evidence representing neurons, and therefore the noise being initially accumulated is biased to the higher 
value. 
 
Comparison of non-aot models with aot models showed that models with aot gave better fits to empirical 
data compared to their non-aot counterparts (aot models’ BIC are lower than non-aot versions (by >70 on 
average)). And again, the model with drift rate modulation with non-stationary evidence (DRB-IE) gave 
the best fit with the lowest BIC score (Figure 3.8). However, even this best fitting model did not achieve a 
fit quality comparable to the best models of our previous experiment, warranting further model development 







      
Figure 3.8: Fits of the models endowed with accumulation onset time (aot) parameter. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Aot parameter endowed model simulated RT distributions and conditional accuracy functions overlaid on 
empirical data for comparison. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Average parameter estimates and goodness of fit measures for AOT parameter incorporated models. 
 
In order to further investigate the very fast response behavior, we examined early motor preparation in the 
electrophysiological data. Recall that in the BCV task we traced anticipatory, relative motor preparation in 
the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), baseline-corrected  relative to the time period just prior to the 
targets when the subject would not yet have any knowledge of the upcoming action-value mapping. In the 
case of the BAV task, the action-value mapping is fixed and known throughout the block, and therefore the 
motor bias might already be present even before target onset. Thus, the LRP could not be relied upon for 






30 Hz band over motor cortex) as the index of motor preparation in this task (Donner 2009), since as a 
spectral amplitude signal, it does not require baseline correction to a recent reference time.  
 
 
Figure 3.10: mu/beta lateralized motor activity A) Activity ipsilateral (-) and contralateral (- -) to high value side 
(where-high). Target locked – TG, Cue locked – Cue. B) Activity ipsilateral (-) and contralateral (- -) to the responded 
side (button-pressed). Response locked – Resp. Note that the y-axes are flipped so that increasing motor preparation, 
reflected in decreases of spectral amplitude, is represented as upwards. 
 
Examination of the mu/beta signal showed that motor preparation  was higher at the onset of the color cue 
for the more valuable side, which reflects a starting-point bias (t(10) = 5.57, p < 0.001). In addition, motor 
preparation activity was increasing for both the high and low value  side (Figure 3.10). This corresponds to 
an evidence-independent urgency signal which can be equivalently implemented as collapsing bounds in 
the framework of drift diffusion models (Churchland et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2018). Following this 
idea, we endowed our basic models with a collapsing bound parameter (cb, quantifying the rate of bound 
collapse): 
   b (t) = bound - (cb*t)   
Addition of the equation above provided a linearly decreasing bound (or symmetrically increasing for the 
error bound) that results in choice when crossed. We proceeded to test whether the addition of this parameter 












Figure.12: Collapsing bounds (CB) parameter endowed model simulated RT distributions and conditional accuracy 
functions overlaid on empirical data for comparison. 
 
Table 3.3: Average parameter estimates and goodness of fit measures for CB parameter incorporated models. 
 
 
While models with collapsing bounds gave better fits than their constant-bound counterparts (Figure 3.11, 
compare to 3.5), among the models with collapsing bounds, variable starting point models gave better fits 
than increasing-evidence models both for drift rate and starting point bias models (Figure 3.11). This shows 






and plausible candidates for possible mechanisms explaining the behavior. The likely reason for the 
superiority of variable starting point models in this case is that none of the other models has a means to 
generate the significant number of very early biased responses occurring before the evidence begins to drive 
the decisions. As a final step, we thus endowed the 6 models with  both aot and cb parameter additions to 
achieve an adequate fit to the data, in order to comprehensively address our main question - whether the 




Figure 3.13: Fits of the models endowed both with accumulation onset time (aot) and collapsing bounds (cb) 
parameters. 
 
Integrating both aot and cb parameters in our models (Figure 3.13) increased the goodness of fit in general 
(compare to Figure 3.5). A comparison of bias types and fast error mechanisms revealed that these additions 
led to the elimination of differences in fit quality of the different fast error mechanisms. Specifically, the 
VS and IE models gave fits similar to each other and only slightly better than the models without any fast 
error mechanism. Meanwhile, comparing bias type, we again saw that drift rate bias models consistently 
gave better fits than starting point bias models (rmANOVA, main effect of bias type: F(1,10)=10.78, p < 
0.01; no other significant main effect or interaction), implying that regardless of the fast error mechanism 
(variable starting point, increasing evidence, or neither), the drift rate bias is the more plausible mechanism 










Figure 3.14: aot and cb parameter endowed model simulated RT distributions and conditional accuracy functions 
overlaid on empirical data for comparison (see Appendix Figure B.1 for easier comparison of all 24 models) 
 
Table 3.2 : Average parameter estimates and goodness of fit measures for AOT & CB  parameters incorporated 
models. 
 
We next examined the electrophysiological signals, LRP and CPP, reflecting the activity in motor and 










Figure 3.15: Upper panel, Cue and response locked LRP. Lower panel, Cue and response locked CPP.  
 
As stated above,  starting point biases are not certain to be reliably indexed by the LRP in this case, as there 
might be biased activity even before the color-disc targets are presented, which is the time used as the 
baseline to correct the LRP signals. The starting point bias was instead confirmed in the Mu/Beta signatures 
of motor preparation, as shown above. The LRP can, nevertheless, be reliably used to detect any fast 
dynamic changes that might differ across conditions. The turn-around effect was qualitatively apparent for 
slow, correct low-value-cued trials, although a two-tailed test of the deflection itself did not quite reach 
significance (time interval 160–190 ms compared to 0–30 ms; t(10) = 2.047, p = 0.068). LRP starting levels 
around cue onset (-50 to 50 ms) also exhibited behavior-predictive starting point variability (one-way 
ANOVA for low-value fast, slow, error: F(2,30) = 7.44, p = 0.0024). 
 
The CPP exhibited a dip pattern ( t(10) = 4.04, p = 0.0024, difference in amplitude between 240–270 ms 
and 170–200 ms greater than that expected for monotonic buildup). Thus, the turn-around effect is not 
specific to or introduced at the level of motor preparation and is manifested in upstream, motor-independent 
processing levels, consistent with modulations of the accumulator input. 
 
 Thus, although less pronounced than the original BCV task, our observation of turn-around dynamics again 
provides confirmatory evidence for the operation of drift rate biases in this task since starting-point biases 
on their own cannot induce a relative motor preparation signal that initially launches toward the higher-
value but incorrect bound on low-value trials. However, since these models have taken on a mechanism to 
begin accumulating earlier than the color-discriminating evidence becomes available, all DRB models 
technically have the ability to initially launch in the higher value direction in this way, because the pre-
evidence accumulation is itself biased. Dynamic simulations indeed show that this is the case for both 














Whereas in the original task the color options were associated with different values and instructed 
to the subjects before each block, in this version, target locations on the screen - and thus the response hands 
- were associated with different values and instructed to the subjects before each block. This corresponds 
to a value-color mapping that changes randomly from trial to trial and hence requires faster establishment 
of color-value associations. We hypothesised that in this scenario, biasing would occur more at the motor 
level than the sensory level, and specifically in the form of a starting-point bias. However, behavioral and 
electrophysiological signatures were again more in line with a biased, dynamic drift rate being the central 
factor of the decision making process.  
 
Figure 3.17: Motor preparation signals. 
 
Although it is remarkable that DRB models have lower BIC than SPB models, there is also very clear 
evidence in the neural motor preparation signals for starting point biases. In fact a comparison of the BCV 
and BAV tasks revealed that the pre-cue motor preparation bias degree was significantly greater in the 






amplitude difference between ipsilateral and contralateral to where the high value target is for BCV and 
BAV tasks at 700ms post-target timepoint, just before evidence onset t(28) = 2.33, p = 0.027). It is important 
to note that the AOT feature could in fact effectively generate starting point biases because the noise that 
is accumulated before the evidence is actually value-biased noise for the DRB models, on the basis that 
spontaneous baseline activity of sensory neurons or their read out could be biased as well as the sensory 
response, in a similar way to how attention is known to modulate spontaneous baseline neuronal firing rates 
(e.g. Luck et al 1997). This endows the DRB models to produce a little bit of a SPB effectively. 
 
Our main goal here was to further test which bias type dominates - SPB vs DRB. However, the chapter 
highlights a couple of very interesting additional mechanisms that, like our increasing evidence innovation 
in Chapter 2, diverge distinctly from the standard DDM model used most widely, and again, the neural data 
greatly facilitate examining them directly.  
 
Whether or not bounds are constant or collapse over time has become increasingly contentious in the field, 
with some behavioral modeling researchers claiming to find that constant models almost always provide a 
superior behavioral fit (Hawkins et al 2015; Ratcliff et al 2016), and neurophysiology work on the other 
hand finding empirical signatures of 'urgency' which effectively implements a collapsing bound (Hanks et 
al 2014; Steinemann et al 2018). Here we find that in the context of very time-constrained sensorimotor 
decisions, a collapsing bound does improve the fit to behavior. 
 
Recent theoretical and psychophysics research has suggested that nondecision time may in fact be 
strategically adjustable (Teichert et al 2015; 2016). Severely time-constrained decisions are a very 
interesting case because although the sensory onset itself is powerful and assuredly can trigger a decision 
process, the deadline is so tight that the subjects may not have the luxury to wait for the accumulation to be 
triggered by the sensory response itself, and may instead have to endogenously start accumulating at around 
the time they expect the evidence to appear, or even slightly in advance to ensure that the process is already 
underway when discriminatory evidence begins to be represented. This is an idea that will be interesting to 
study in dedicated experiments in the future. 
 
In comparison to findings of Chapter 2, an interesting development here is that when the AOT and CB 
features were included, all drift rate bias models appear to capture the behavioral data equally well (Figure 
3.9). This suggests that the crucial non-standard feature that a model must have to adequately fit value-
biased sensorimotor behavior and accurately identify drift rate biases is a drift rate that can dynamically 
change from being mostly value-driven to being mostly sensory-driven. The increasing-evidence model is 
just one way of achieving this and worked well both in the BCV and BAV paradigms, but allowing for 
early accumulation of biased baseline activity can also produce a qualitatively similar dynamic handing 
over form value- to sensory-driven accumulation. As in the original experiment,  a turn-around effect was 
also observed in slow low value correct trials in the empirical LRP waveforms, confirming this dynamic 
interplay effect (Figure 3.10). Interestingly, even the drift rate bias model without either of the original “fast 
error mechanisms” of starting point variability or increasing evidence fits comparably well in this model 
framework. This is because the early accumulation itself provides a mechanism to generate these fast errors, 







Overall, these findings suggest that participants are able to establish color-value associations in the short 
time frame of each trial and value-modulation of sensory responses may be a general mechanism that 
applies in any severely time-restricted sensorimotor task regardless of time-scale of value association. As 
was the case with the original experiment, however, empirical evidence for the sensory response itself being 


























Chapter 4  INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF DYNAMIC SENSORY STIMULUS 
FEATURES  
Testing the predictions of dynamic stimulus manipulations 
 
In the previous chapters we established that a biased, dynamic drift rate mechanism provides the 
strongest account of value-biased decision formation in situations with long-term action-value associations 
as well as with long-term sensory-value associations.  The second major outcome of the original study was 
the development of a plausible sensory response model that could implement the same kind of biased 
dynamic drift rate as the abstract model, through value-based modulations of the sensory response. In the 
current experiment we followed up on this to investigate the impact of sensory stimulus manipulations that 
should alter the initial dynamics of feature-selective sensory representations. In our proposed model, the 
dynamic shift of influence from value to sensory information is due to an initial non-selective detection 
response on which value has a dominant influence, and then gradually a sensory-selective activity builds 
up that is integrated (Figure 4A - right panel). The crucial part of the model explaining the turnaround 
dynamics in low-value trials is that the sensory responses are assumed to be initially nonselective for color 
under neutral conditions, so that when they are biased, the incorrect but high value sensory response initially 
dominates before being overtaken by the sensory response for the presented, low-value alternative.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 : (Upper panel) Suggested temporal profile of sensory response and differential evidence for regular color 
change trials (as in BCV and BAV tasks). (Lower panel) Suggested temporal profile of sensory response and 
differential evidence for brighter intensity transient, flash trials. Arrows highlight a key change in flash trials compared 
to regular trials.  
 
If this is the case, then under conditions with a stronger non-selective detection response, there 






hence more fast errors, and the initial value-driven launch of the differential decision variable reflected in 
the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) should be more steeply negative in low value cued trials (integral 
of difference waveform in Figure 4.1 - lower right panel (green trace)). In order to test this hypothesis 
regarding the nonselective initial response, we manipulated the initial dynamics of the color change cue in 
such a way as to produce temporal profiles similar to those shown in Figure 4.1 (lower panel). Specifically, 
trials of the canonical version of the task were interleaved with ‘Flash’ trials in which the cue begins with 
a sudden bright but non-discriminating flash and then fades to one of the color alternatives to evoke a more 
intense and longer-lasting initial nonselective phase. We labeled this task Bimanual Initial-Onset (BIO) 




15 naive subjects (ranging in age from 23 to 34 years old (mean=26 years), 9 female) were recruited 
for this study. $12 per hour compensation was given to the subjects and they could earn up to $12 
additionally depending on the points they earned (1 pts = $0.0044). The experiments took place in a dark, 
sound-attenuated booth. Participants were seated 57 cm from a CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 85 Hz 
and resolution of 600 x 800. Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on a small square (0.5o of 
visual angle) in the center of the screen for the duration of each trial, and eye position was monitored with 
a remote eye tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research, 1000Hz) same with the previous experiment.  
 
In order to evoke a greater non-selective detection response and enhance the dynamic, value-to-
sensory shift effect, the canonical task used for the original experiment (BCV) was modified to include 
“flash” trials (Figure 4.2). In these randomly interleaved (50%) ‘Flash’ trials, the cue begins with a sudden 
bright but non-discriminating flash (higher luminance color midway between cyan and green) and then 
immediately, linearly fades to one of the color alternatives (matching regular cyan/green targets in 
luminance) in 50ms in order to evoke a more intense and longer-lasting initial nonselective phase. 
 







Note that the regular green and cyan luminances were set lower than in the original BCV task here 
to allow for the brightening manipulation on flash trials. Since the initial nondiscriminating part of the 
stimulus on Flash trials made the task more difficult, we increased the response deadline to 385 ms.  
 
Our modelling and simulation and electrophysiological analysis methods were the same as in the 
previous experiments, except that we used a set bound (bound=1) and a free noise parameter (s); and here 
we only focussed on the VMSR model described in Chapter 2, and  the Standard Dual Bias (SDB) model 
for a comparison (see Appendix.C for matlab scripts of models). To capture behavior on both the Flash and 
the regular trials here, we added 3 more free parameters to the VMSR model to allow for differences in 
initial amplitude, onset and decay timing in the two trial types (see below), and added an analogous 3 free 
parameters to the SDB model so that it had consistent degrees of freedom.  
4.2 Results 
 Plotting the behavioral data for both trial types separately (Fig 4.3), reaction time and error rate 
data revealed the main indicators of biased decision making in both trial types (reg/flash). Error rate for 
high value trials were less than error rate for low value trials (2x2 rmANOVA, main effect of Value: F(1,14) 
= 70.26, p < 0.0001; reg trials: t(14) = 4.61, p = 4.02x10-4; p < 0.001; flash trials: t(14)=8.99, p=3.45x10-7; 
p < 0.001). Thus subjects erred towards the high value side more often, showing the successful 
implementation of biased choice behavior due to instructing on the more valuable alternative for both 
regular and flash trial types.  Error rates were also higher for the Flash trials than Regular trials (main effect 
Onset Type: F(1,14) = 47.30, p < 0.001). A significant Onset-type x Value interaction (F(1,14)= 16.21 
p=0.001) indicated that the bias to choose the high-value option over the low-value one was also greater in 








Figure 4.3: Reaction time distribution and conditional accuracy plot for high and low value, correct and error trials for 
regular (right) and flash (left) trials.  
 
A 2x2x2 rmANOVA with the factors Onset-type (reg/flash), Value (hi/low) x Choice ( correct/error) 
revealed a significant Value x Choice interaction (F(1,14) = 62.675, p < 0.001). This is driven by the fact 
that correct RT was much faster for high than low value trials in both conditions (regular: t(14) = 9.03, p < 
0.001; flash: t(14) = 6.90, p < 0.001) but error RT slightly slower (regular: t(14) = 4.23, p < 0.001; flash: 
t(14) = 3.38, p = 0.0045). There was also a significant main effect of Choice (F(1,14) = 109.240, p < 0.001) 
due to the faster RT for errors and of Value (F(1,14) = 24.28, p = 0.000) reflecting the dominant RT speeding 
with higher value in the Correct RTs. There was an overall main effect of Onset-type (F(1,14) = 7.64 , p = 
0.015) but no significant interaction of this with the other factors. 
 
We then went on to fit and simulate the biologically plausible VMSR model simultaneously to both types 
of trial. In order to allow for the model to capture the flash task features, we added 3 parameters to the 
existing VMSR model to allow  flash trials to take on a different non-decision time (tndF), initial amplitude 
(RmF, parameterised as additional amount above regular trials) and decay time constant (tauF) than for 
regular trials. Importantly, because the luminance fades in Flash trials, the decay was applied to both the 
preferred and unpreferred idealised sensory response in the Flash trials (Fig 4.4). The preferred response 
asymptoted at the same level Rm as for regular trials, given they ultimately reach the same color values. 
We also fit and simulated the standard dual bias (SDB) model from Chapter 2 as a benchmark against which 
to compare the fit of the VMSR model. Analogous to the VMSR model, we added 3 additional parameters 
to the SDB to make 11 free parameters altogether, by including a separate non-decision time (tnd) for the 
flash trials (tndF; though note the degree of value-bias in tnd implemented via an extra delay to make low-
value responses, was constrained to be the same across regular and flash conditions), and a separate drift 
rate (dF) and drift rate bias (dBF) for flash trials; resulting in four different variables: dHF (drift rate for 
high value flash trials), dBH (biased drift rate for high value flash trials), dLF (drift rate for low value flash 




Figure 4.4: Schematic illustrating the temporal profile of sensory response for flash trials. 
 
The parameter estimates and fit quality metrics are provided in Table 4.1. Overall, the VMSR model 
provided a substantially better quantitative fit. As expected, the VMSR model estimated that in Flash trials, 
the sensory response had a higher initial amplitude (RmF > Rm), an earlier onset (lower value for tndF) 
and a longer decay time (tauF).  
 










Figure 4.5: Goodness of fit (BIC) values of VMSR and SDB models for BIO task. VMSR = value modulated sensory 
response. SDB = standard dual bias. Error bars indicate standard errors after factoring out the between-subject 
variability. 
 
BIC score comparison revealed that the VMSR model better fit the data compared to the Standard-dual bias 








Figure 4.6: VMSR model behavior simulation overlaid the empirical data for comparison (see Figure C.2 for 
compound plot, empirical and VMSR model simulated data are plotted together for both onset type). 
Simulation of the VMSR model reaction time data showed that while the model captured the RT distribution 
for error trials in both Regular and Flash trials, it underestimated the proportion of correct responses in the 
250-350ms band for high value trials and in the 375-475ms band for low value trials in regular onset trials. 
Although the bimodal nature of the correct flash trials is not captured by the model simulation data, the 
proportion of trials in each quartile were similar to empirical data. 
 
We went on to examine both the empirical and simulated trajectories of the decision variable for 
the VMSR model to test our further prediction of a bigger turn-around effect for flash trials compared to 
regular trials. Decision variable simulation reveals that, although there is a crossing from the incorrect 
bound side to the correct bound side, the signature of value-biased negative drift rate that causes launching 
towards the incorrect bound is not visible in the low value slow-correct flash trials. Increased activity 
towards the high-value choice (the error bound for low value cued trials, lower bound in the figure) for a 
more sustained period and eventual turn-around to low-value correct bound is observable. The empirical 
LRP dynamics apparently show that the turnaround effect is greater in the Regular trials than the Flash 
trials, opposite our expectation, though the low-value correct trials do reach a lower level before beginning 
to increase in the Flash trials, owing to a more sustained preceding negative shift. Directly contrasting the 
Flash and Regular conditions for the high and low value trials regardless of behavioral outcome further 
indicates that the starting point bias appears different despite there being, in principle, no reason for 
differences in expectation given the random interleaving of the trial types. We discuss these results in more 






Figure 4.7: (Upper panel)LRP, and (lower panel) VMSR model simulated decision variable traces for regular and 






In this second study of evaluating the context specificity of dynamic biasing mechanism in value-
biased perceptual decisions, we modified the canonical version of RVBCD task by including flash trials 
where an initial bright flash (midway hue between target colors (cyan and green)) is presented followed by 
gradual decrease of brightness and gradual change of hue into one of the target colors in first 50ms of 
stimulus. Besides testing for the plausibility of dynamic biasing mechanism under these particular decision 
conditions, this manipulation of stimulus features aimed to evoke a bigger and longer initial non-selective 
sensory response period for investigating the temporal dynamics of the interplay between value information 
and sensory evidence.  
 
The VMSR model provided a significantly better quantitative goodness of fit than the Standard 
Dual Bias Model, which reaffirms the key role of biased, dynamically changing drift rate in capturing key 
behavioral features such as the initial value-dominated responding, which standard, stationary evidence 
models struggle to capture. 
 
Our main prediction was that due to this initial non-selective sensory period, the initial influence 
of value information on the accumulation process will be even more pronounced, allowing particular 






value bias and a steeper and long-lasting initial launch of the differential decision variable toward the 
higher-value bound (i.e., bigger turn-around effect).  
 
Behavioural data, as well as the parameters of the Value-modulated sensory response (VMSR) 
model, indicated that there was indeed an increase in fast errors, especially those biased toward the higher 
value, in the Flash trials, and that due to the initial response magnitude being greater (compare Rmf > Rm 
parameters), the initial drift rate would indeed be more steeply aimed toward the higher value bound in 
Flash trials. Thus, there is again a dynamic shift of influence from value to sensory information driving 
action choices in this task, but in Flash trials the initial value-dominance begins earlier and lasts longer due 
to the initial non-selective sensory period.  
 
However, both simulated and real differential decision variable dynamics did not turn out as 
predicted. First, there was no strong evidence for a sharp, stimulus-driven initial launch toward the higher 
value option in low-value trials in the LRP, and simulations showed that even with the VMSR model 
estimating that the drift rate would indeed be initially negative, the simulated traces for correct, low value 
trials did not show signs of such a turn-around. This likely indicates that in practice, because the process is 
started already close to the bound, the trials on which there is an appreciable launch toward the lower bound 
in low value trials almost always culminate in an error, and few trials are “rescued” after straying towards 
that incorrect bound.   
 
 
In summary, although confirming the main predictions of this study of more low value fast errors, 
more value bias towards the incorrect bound for low value trials, empirical LRP data and VMSR model 
decision variable simulations were not able to replicate the pronounced turn-around curve observed in the 
LRP data of BCV task. Thus, the decision process again strongly implicates a  value-modulated drift rate 
bias and increasing evidence mechanism, but due to the increased time pressure in the flash trials, it is 
possible that subjects set a low bound and therefore there is not enough space for the decision variable to 
appreciably stray toward the high-value bound on low-value trials and then be rerouted by sensory activity 
to the correct choice bound. This underlines the importance of simulating cognitive models when aiming 
to accurately interpret recorded neural signals of decision formation. As recorded LRP waveforms might 
implicate various layers of data processing shaped by the biology of neural activity, further modelling 
efforts based on biological processes may yield more veridical replication of electroencephalographic data.  
 
A limitation of the current study is that there were half the number of trials per condition as we 
had in the BCV study for Chapter 2. This is combined with an unfortunate randomisation replication 
across sessions due to the Matlab random number generator not being re-seeded, resulting in 6 subjects 
receiving an identical sequence of trial conditions presumably containing runs of trials that led subjects to 
falsely anticipate the next trial. This led to a spurious result of the starting point bias being different in the 
two onset types despite the subject not being able to possibly guess which onset type trial is following 










Chapter 5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS - VALUE-BIASED DECISION MAKING IN 
CLINICAL POPULATIONS 
 
Another open question is how the mentioned neural dynamics diverge from healthy controls in 
clinical populations. This part examines the applicability of our paradigm to clinical research and 
diagnostics. Our task reveals large inter-individual differences such as some people are conservative, some 
are opportunistic and some are extremist in their decision strategies, so investigating fast value biased 
decision making in clinical populations is important as it can shed light on the particular differences 
associated with the disorder and findings can be used for diagnostic approach. In ongoing work arising from 
the work in this thesis, we have begun to recruit patients from the following three groups for assessment: 
Major depressive disorder (MDD), social anxiety disorder (SAD) and borderline personality disorder 
(BPD). Here, we provide a brief outline of the motivation of this work and preliminary findings, as a 




5.1.1 Major Depressive Disorder: 
Depressive disorder is implicated with sad, empty, or irritable mood as well as somatic and cognitive 
changes that significantly affect the person’s capacity to function (DSM-V, 155). Particularly major 
depressive disorder is characterized by “discrete episodes of at least 2 weeks’ duration (although it generally 
lasts longer) with changes in affect, cognition, and neurovegetative functions (weight loss, insomnia, 
fatigue) and inter-episode remissions” (DSM-V, 155). Diagnostic criteria is supplied in the appendix. In 
MDE (major depressive episode) feelings of worthlessness and self-loathing are common (DSM-V, 161). 
Depression is a major cause of morbidity worldwide (World Health Organization, 2001). While lifetime 
prevalence estimate is 17% in the US, 8–12% of populations are shown to be affected from depression in 
most countries (Andrade et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2003). The probability of having a major depressive 
episode in a year is 3-5% for males and 8-10% for females in North America (Kessler et al., 2005; Murphy 
et al., 2000). Prevalence in 18- to 29-year-old individuals is 3 times higher than prevalence in individuals 
with the age of 60 years or older (DSM-V, 165). Mortality due to suicide is related to feeling worthless, 
undeserving of life or being unable to cope with pain of depression (DSM-V, 161). And mortality rate is 
7.5 per 100.000 population. Projection studies indicate that depression may be the second leading cause of 
mortality after heart disease by 2020 (Lopez and Murray, 1998). Major comorbid disorders with MDD are 
substance-related disorders, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, anorexia nervosa, bulimia 
nervosa, and borderline personality disorder (DSM-V, 168). 
 
In literature main neurophysiological and neuroendocrinological correlates of the disorder are hyperactivity 
in hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, genetic variants in neurotrophic factors and pro-inflammatory 
cytokines, and abnormalities in neural systems of emotion processing and reward seeking. Some of the 
diagnostic features of MDD are difficulty thinking, concentrating, or making decisions as well as 
impairment in general functioning (DSM-V, 163). While these altered cognitive capabilities are key in 
diagnosing MDD, underlying neural mechanisms of these changes are not clear. This study aims to 
investigate the altered reward-based perceptual decision making in this patient population in order to target 







In literature it has been shown that depression involves altered reward processing (Whitton et al., 2015). 
Studies show that depression is characterized by an inability to modulate behavior in response to 
intermittent rewards measured by probabilistic reward task, suggested to be due to decreased phasic striatal 
dopaminergic signaling that is implicated in allocation of attention to reward-predictive cues for reward 
learning (Vrieze et al., 2013; Pizzagalli et al., 2008). Also the study shows that reward learning impairment 
is more pronounced in individuals with anhedonia. Another study showed that depressed individuals show 
blunted reward anticipation and willingness (motivation) to exert effort in order to obtain rewards 
(Treadway et al., 2012). Measured by Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT or “effort”) – a task 
that requires subjects to choose between a potential low-effort, low-reward outcome vs. a high-effort, high-
reward outcome – individuals with MDD were less willing to exert physical effort to obtain potentially 
larger rewards relative to controls. Another study found reduced feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
amplitude – an ERP deflection thought to originate from reward prediction error-related activity in the 
dorsal ACC and striatal regions – predicts MDD onset (Bress et al., 2013). Another study showed that 
during performance of an instrumental reinforcement task involving selection of stimuli probabilistically 
linked to rewards, NAcc, ACC, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activation during acquisition 
of reward contingencies was significantly lower in subjects with MDD compared to healthy controls (Hall 
et al., 2014). Another recent study corroborates and furthers this finding by showing a deficit in reward 
anticipation rather than in consummation in depressive subjects (Sherdell, 2012). This is also exhibited by 
a reduced relative left frontal EEG asymmetry during reward anticipation in MDD subjects (Shankman et 
al., 2007), distinguishing this population from panic disorder subjects (Shankman et al., 2013). So reward 
processing in major depressive disorder is characterized by dysfunction in allocation of attention to reward-
predictive cues, effort-based reward-related decision making, and reinforcement learning (Whitton et al., 
2015).  
5.1.2 Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social anxiety disorder is implicated with an intense fear or anxiety of social situations in which the 
individual is concerned that s/he will act or appear in a way that will be negatively judged and/or cause 
rejection by others; such as showing anxiety symptoms, trembling, sweating, offending others by saying or 
doing something (DSM-V, 203). Key features of the disorder are that the social situations almost always 
cause fear or anxiety for the individual, the individual often tries to avoid the feared social situation or 
endures with great fear and anxiety (blushing, tachycardia), the individual overestimates the negative 
consequences, and the symptoms interfere with the individual's functioning, characterized by social 
dysfunction. A duration of 6 months or more is important for distinctive diagnosis (DSM-V, 204). 
Diagnostic criteria is supplied in the appendix. One year prevalence of social anxiety disorder in United 
States is around 7% and diagnosis rate is ~1.8 times higher for females than males. Rate difference is more 
profound in adolescents and young adults and total prevalence decreases with age. SAD is found with higher 
rate in indigenous Americans and with lower rate in Asian, Latino, African American, and Afro-Caribbean 
people compared to non-Hispanic whites (DSM-V, 204). SAD is generally comorbid with other anxiety 
disorders, major depressive disorder, substance use disorders, bipolar disorder or body dysmorphic 
disorder. In children, it is comorbid with high-functioning autism and selective mutism (DSM-V, 208). 
 
In the main reward network in brain, dopaminergic neurons in ventral tegmental area sends reward-
predictive bursts that are coding the reward magnitude and probability to striatum (nucleus accumbens), 
orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (Schultz, 
1998). Concerning general reward processing, in several anxiety disorders, an abnormal frontal EEG 
asymmetry (greater relative right activation) (Nitschke et al., 1999) is found and specifically in generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD) patients a larger ERN (error related negativity - a negative deflection ~50 ms after 
an error response and reflecting anterior cingulate cortex activity) is found (Weinberg et al., 2012). A fMRI 






social rewards during anticipation and outcome phases, where there was higher vmPFC activation for non-
social reward outcome (Richey et al., 2014). Also, compared to the reduced sensitivity to reward in 
depressive disorders, it is suggested that a heightened sensitivity to threat is the mechanism of anxiety 
(Shankman, 2013). In line with this premise amygdala dysfunction is implicated in SAD subjects compared 
to healthy controls (Cooney et al., 2006).  
 
While MDD and SAD are grouped under negative affective state disorders and expected to show similar 
results in reward related decision making, a recent study concerning the traits associated with these 
disorders investigated the difference in sad versus anxious individuals and showed that in gambling and job 
selection decisions, sad subjects are biased towards high-risk/high-reward options, while anxious subjects 
preferred low-risk/low-reward (risk averse) options (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). They elaborate that 
the underlying mechanism is an implicit goal of reward replacement in sadness, and an implicit goal of 
uncertainty reduction in anxiety. However another study challenges this idea by showing that MDD subjects 
exhibit less neural response in reward related areas (ACC, caudate, and OFC) both in decision and outcome 
phases (Forbes, 2006). 
5.1.3 Borderline Personality Disorder: 
BPD is implicated with emotional instability, feelings of worthlessness, insecurity, impulsivity, and 
impaired social relationships. Patients try to avoid real or imagined abandonment due to their intolerance 
of being alone. They generally have unstable sense of self and interpersonal relationships that alternates 
between idealization and devaluation. They show impulsivity in self-damaging activities such as spending, 
sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating. Suicidal behavior, mood instability and intense anger 
are also symptoms of BPD (DSM-V, 663). Diagnostic criteria is supplied in the appendix. Mean prevalence 
of borderline personality disorder is 1.6% in general population. In primary care settings the prevalence is 
estimated to be 6%, in outpatient mental health clinics it is around 10% and among psychiatric inpatients it 
is around 20%. Most patients show the symptoms in early adulthood and it has been observed that 
prevalence of BPD decreases with age (DSM-V, 665). Personality disorders are grouped under three 
clusters (supplied in the appendix). Based on descriptive similarities, BPD is included in Cluster B where 
individuals with these disorders appear dramatic, emotional, erratic. Common comorbid disorders with 
BPD are depressive and bipolar disorders, antisocial personality disorder, substance use disorders, eating 
disorders (notably bulimia nervosa), posttraumatic stress disorder, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (DSM-V, 665). 
 
Impulsivity (rapid and unplanned action) and risk-taking propensity are major symptoms of BPD 
(Critchfield et al, 2004, Henry et al., 2001; Coffey et al., 2011). The rate of failure to inhibit response was 
found to be higher in stop signal delay task in BPD subjects compared to controls suggesting that behavioral 
response disinhibition is a core feature (Coffey et al., 2011). In another study utilizing a delay discounting 
task, it has been found that BPD group had a higher rate of discounting the delayed reward and greater 
preference for immediate rewards compared to control group while there was not a tendency to make rapid 
decision making as reaction times were similar with control group (Lawrence et al., 2010). This study also 
shows that impulsivity trait measured by Barratt Impulsiveness Scale was correlated with the rate of reward 
discounting in BPD subjects. While risk taking is a general phenomenon found in BPD subjects where 
patients engage in behaviors such as reckless driving, substance abuse, gambling (Jessor, 1998); a study 
measuring risk taking propensity by utilizing Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) showed no difference 
between BPD and control groups. The underlying neural mechanism of impulsivity is suggested to be 
disturbed serotonin (5-HT) transmission. A study measuring 5-HT precursor analog (α-[11C]methyl-l-
tryptophan (α-[11C]MTrp)) with positron emission tomography showed that serotonin synthesis capacity 
was significantly lower in medial frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate gyrus, temporal gyrus, and in striatum in 






Another study investigating electrophysiological markers of impaired reward processing in BPD subjects 
showed that in a gambling task, theta-band responses to negative feedback were reduced in BPD subjects, 
suggesting dysfunction in reward related feedback processing (Andreou et al., 2015). However, a recent 
review of impulse control shows prefrontal dysfunction during stimulus interference, response interference 
and behavioral inhibition in BPD subjects, where emotionally neutral paradigms gave weaker and 
inconsistent results (Sebastian et al., 2013). Implicating both response interference and behavioral inhibition 
aspects of decision making, current study is important in examining the unsettled non-emotional rapid-
decision performance of BPD subjects.  
This study utilizes the original rapid value biased color discrimination task and test the hypotheses 
that: major depressive disorder (MDD) subjects will show more value based biasing in line with the 
proposition that sadness primes an implicit goal of reward replacement; social anxiety disorder (SAD) 
subjects will be less biased for value and will try to be more accurate in line with the proposition that anxiety 
primes an implicit goal of uncertainty reduction; and BPD subjects will have more responses towards high 
value option and more “too early” responses as it is associated with impulsivity and high risk taking 
behavior. 
 
5.2 Methods  
In this clinical study, 15 subjects from three clinical groups are planned to be recruited (MDD=15, SAD=15, 
BPD=15). Recruitment is done via ads, flyers, and referral from mental health institutions, hospitals, clinics 
(Appendix.D). After the participant sends an email or calls via phone, clinical research assistants follow up 
with an email. A phone interview is scheduled for screening to determine if they are eligible. Phone 
screening document is attached. Semi structured clinical phone interview that is adapted from SCID 
(Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5) is used. Clinical team decides if the person should be further 
assessed with formal SCID. If they are eligible, they are invited to the lab and clinical team conducts the 
SCID I and II and suicide assessment while the process is video recorded for later review. They decide 
whether the person is eligible for the study and also which group they are in (BPD, SAD, MDD). Thus the 
assessment  of the disorder and diagnosis are performed via SCID and BPD traits are measured by 
questionnaires. If eligible, on another day the participant comes to the lab for the EEG recording session. 
RVBCD (canonical rapid value biased color discrimination task) and Cyberball tasks are utilized. During 
the EEG recording; eye-position, heart rate, skin conductance (GSR) and breathing rate are also recorded. 
Participants are compensated with $75 for participating in the study which included filling questionnaires, 
EEG, ECG, GSR recording, and answering quick daily questions on their phone in the next 7 days after 
they leave the lab. 
 
Canonical version of rapid color discrimination task with color-value mapping is utilized as in Chapter 2. 
As we have cited from literature it has been suggested that in gambling decisions sad individuals are biased 
in favor of high risk/high-reward options, while anxious individuals are biased in favor of low-risk/ low-
reward options. Also it is evidenced that BPD subjects show risk-taking behavior and impulsivity.  This 
study will test the hypotheses that in RVBCD task: MDD subjects will be more biased for value in line with 
the proposition that sadness primes an implicit goal of reward replacement and we expect to see reduced 
reward learning correlating with the level of anhedonia present, SAD subjects will be less biased for high-
value and will try to be more accurate in line with the proposition that anxiety primes an implicit goal of 
uncertainty reduction. BPD subjects are hypothesized to have more “too early” responses for high value 
option as it is associated with impulsivity and high risk-taking behavior. The divergence of value-biased 
decision making of these populations from healthy controls will be investigated with measuring bias level 
and type with modeling and simulation. LRP and CPP will be analyzed for electrophysiological indices of 
value bias mechanisms, and decision dynamics simulations of each clinical group will be compared with 







5.3 Preliminary Results  
 
Up to date 7 Healthy Controls (HC), 2 Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), 3 Social Anxiety Disorder 
(SAD) and 4 Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) participants are found eligible and took part in the 
experiment. While all of these subjects are included in the behavioral results, for the electrophysiological 
results 3 of HC, 2 of MDD, 2 of SAD and 3 of BPD subjects yielded analyzable data.  
 

















Figure 5.1: Reaction Time distributions, LRP and CPP for Healthy Controls and Clinical Subjects. 
 
Typically to date, experiments are tailored for particular clinical population traits, and basic value-biased 
decision making patterns of these populations are not closely investigated, as we see that the basic decision 
dynamics that we generally  research in healthy subjects are not interrogated in high order cognitive clinical 
populations. 
As the literature lacks clear understanding of these basic mechanisms in clinical populations that 
are implicated with non-optimal decision making (e.g MDD - Forbes et al., 2007; SAD - Richey et al., 
2013; BPD - Lawrence et al., 2010), the divergence of the behavioral and electrophysiological indices of 
how value biases split-second perceptual decisions in patient populations from healthy controls is important 
to shed light on the basic mechanism of decision making and has the potential of being a diagnostic tool. 
Although too few subjects have been collected at this point to make any meaningful inferences, Figure 5.1 
shows that the general behavioural patterns are generally qualitatively comparable among the groups, and 
some differences in decision process approach may be emerging. For example, the degree of value-biasing 
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Appendix.A Saccadic Response Modality 
Saccadic Tasks Methods: 
Behavioral data from an earlier study from our lab is analyzed (Blangero and Kelly, 2017). For this saccadic 
value-biased perceptual decision making experiment, 15 (seven male) subjects between 22-40 years old 
(mean 29) were recruited. Participants gave informed consent and the experiment was conducted in the 
same setting detailed for the other experiments in the thesis. Subjects completed 6 blocks of 120 trials. 
Subjects were informed about the values associated with each color alternative (40 and 5 points; 
equiluminant green/cyan) before each block. In each trial a central light grey square (0.5˚, equiluminant 
with green/cyan) was presented on a mid-grey background. After fixating on for 400-450 ms, targets were 
presented (green and cyan discs of 2˚ diameter presented peripherally 8˚ to the left and right of fixation). 
Target presentation indicated the stimulus-action mapping for that trial. After 750-800 ms, fixation changed 
to either a green or cyan cue that is imperative for a rapid saccade to the target matching the cue color within 
the 250-300 ms (275 ms for 3 subjects and 300 ms for 5 subjects) deadline. Subjects had to maintain fixation 
on the target for 200ms to earn the reward for a correct trial. Reward was presented on the screen by the 
end of each trial. Earned points were converted to money at the end of the experiment. Color-value mapping 
was counterbalanced across subjects and changed after the third block for each subject. When subjects 
broke fixation in the period between initial fixation and cue presentation, the trial was aborted. If the saccade 
is made before the cue (‘too early’), if the saccade is made towards wrong target (‘wrong target’), if saccade 
is made after the deadline (‘too slow’), or if after 550ms (‘way too slow’) no points were earned. A response 
was deemed correct when subjects made a saccade to the target matching the cued color and held fixation 
in the target window (squares of 3 degrees of visual angle around circular color targets). Monetary reward 
was calculated by randomly choosing a block and multiplying the points earned in that block with $0.005. 
Saccadic Tasks Results: 
In this study we aim to establish the generality of our findings to a different response modality. We 
investigated the canonical version of the task where response modality was saccades instead of button-press 
(Figure A.1A), as in BCV (Chapter 2). As modeling revealed a similar pattern of fit quality confirming 
these type of value-biased sensorimotor fast perceptual decisions are again implicated with dynamic biasing 
mechanism when response modality was saccades. We wanted to complete by analyzing the data of two 
other versions of the task where different shapes (circle and square) are the target options instead of different 
colors so value is associated with shape (Figure A.1B) and where subjects are informed that they will lose 
less points instead of earning more points with a correct choice (Figure A.1C) testing for any effect of risk 
aversion on the decision making dynamics. 
  
Modeling revealed the confirming results for DRB-IE model simulations of behavioral data better, for all 
3 tasks of saccadic response modality. While variable starting points did not significantly increase the 








Figure A.1: Saccadic response modality tasks (Saccadic Color Value (ABA), Saccadic Shape Value (ASH), Saccadic 
Color Loss-Value (ALO)). Manipulation of various factors of value-biased color discrimination task and specifically 
the modality of response. In saccade color-value task (ABA), we again utilize rapid, value-biased color discrimination 
where one color option was associated with higher reward when cued as in Chapter 2 (BCV), however participants 
are asked to report the side matching the cue color with a saccade to that side rather than a mouse button press. These 
responses are similar to bimanual responses in that target position must be encoded before a correct response can be 
executed. 
 
When saccadic response modality is utilized instead of button press, behavioral results again show 
the bias for high value option manifested as faster and more choices towards high value option. While the 
proportion of correct responses was higher for high value option compared to low-value option as in 
canonical version of the task, the mean latencies for all trial types were faster than the BCV task, as saccadic 
response modality is utilized and imperative response deadline was shorter. Since the saccadic responses 






than 325 ms that was used for bimanual button press tasks (BCV) in order to meet the strict deadline criteria 























Table A.1: Average parameter values of basic 6 models for each task (Bimanual Color-Value (BCV), Saccadic 










Appendix.B Bimanual Action-Value 
 
 
Figure B.1: BAV task. Simulated and empirical RT distribution and CAF of six basic models, of models with the 








Appendix.C Bimanual Initial-Onset 
 
 
Figure C.1: Model comparison for Regular and Flash Trials (n=7 , Response Deadline =325ms) 
We had begun our modelling analysis by fitting the basic models for both trial types separately. This abstract model 
comparison showed that drift rate bias models gave better fits than their starting point bias model counterparts for both 
variable starting point and increasing evidence versions for both onset types; and increasing evidence models better 
fit the data compared to variable starting point models for each bias type. Thus, the Drift rate bias model with 
increasing evidence (DRB-IE) gave the lowest BIC score out of 4 basic models for both trial types. Although it is 
expected for regular trials, this result shows that value modulated, increasing evidence mechanism better simulates 
the reaction time behavior in flash trials as well.  
 
 















Appendix.D Clinical Subjects 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
